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The thesis deals with special economic zones (SEZs). The first part, chapter 2-5, explains 
them as a phenomenon. Their history and features/incentives are spelled out, as are their 
underlying rationale – the advantages the host can achieve through them (chapter 4.1). These 
possible advantages include increased employment; cluster effects; technology transfer and 
training; partial policy reforms; laboratory simulations of economic policy and being a means 
of regional policies. An important way SEZs can achieve this is to attract foreign direct 
investments. Also the possible costs of zones are presented (chapter 4.2) as well as their 
alternative cost (chapter 4.3). To complete this part of the analysis chapter 5 presents the point 
of view of the firms, i.e. the investors SEZs are supposed to lure. 
 
The second part of the thesis, chapter 6-7, applies the first part on the case of India. This 
results in some specific advice, implications, for the SEZ policy of India. These include using 
SEZs as laboratories to find beneficial general economic policies and SEZ policies; to include 
the Indian diaspora to a greater extent to achieve the chapter 4.1 advantages; the promotion 
of cluster effects; as well as others. The rapid change in the Indian economy increases the 
uncertainty, but the main recommendations should be robust in all likely scenarios.
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
This thesis will deal with the concept of special economic zones (SEZs). More specifically: 
demarcated zones, holding special economic privileges over the general economy, where 
production of trade and services take place. As it is a rather fuzzy subject I start by putting it 
in a context – general economic policies – and presenting a brief history. Then I discuss some 
advantages and disadvantages, from the hosts’ as well as the potential investors’ point of 
view. Finally I present the case of India, concluding with policy recommendations. The 
recommendations include some novel parts, to my knowledge not treated much in the 
literature. 
 
The literature on the topic is somewhat limited. Paradoxically, this has led to inflation in the 
reference list, because many sources just touch upon the topic in parts of the text. The last 
major reviews are all from the World Bank, respectively Madani (1999); Kusago and 
Tzannatos (1998) and World Bank (1992). Statistics are scarce, making it hard to do any 
quantitative analysis. As do differences between corners of the world make comparisons 
between countries complicated – though some are made.
 
My interest in economic geography started with the elective courses in my Bachelor’s degree 
at NHH. This included a field trip, visiting one of the Maquiladoras in Reynosa, Mexico –
sparking my interest in the phenomenon of special economic zones. When doing a Master of 
Science degree in economics later on, I chose the Maquiladora industry as the topic of one of 
my term papers, as well as opting for courses dealing with international issues, particularly 
trade, investments and decisions of location. An exchange stay at the Indian Institute of 
Management – Ahmedabad (IIMA) spurred me on to the case of India, especially so since the 
revitalising and planned extension of special economic zones was the topic du jour, 
omnipresent in media and conversation. 
 
I would like to give thanks to my advisor, Professor Eirik Vatne, for valuable discussions and 
inputs along the way. Also, a scholarship and stay at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies 
(NIAS) provided good help. My exchange stay at IIMA certainly added to the interest as well, 
this would not have been possible without the broad network of partner schools NHH has 
built. 
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2. Basic Principles of Economic Policy 
 
Since man grouped together, forming tribes and later on cities and civilisations, there have 
been economic policies, coined by the leaders of society and/or the general population. These 
started as simple rules, e.g. division of agricultural land into parcels; taxation for financing of 
common goods or redistribution of wealth; or even embargos against competing groups. Later 
we saw the advent of the monetary system1, a great increase in trade, a near-exponential 
growth in technology and eventually also the economic policies of today. 
 
A fruitful division in the analysis of economic policies is between the macroeconomic level 
and specific policies on lower levels. Lower level does not mean regional/local level or a 
level of less prestige. This is primarily a classification of mine between macroeconomics and 
microeconomics.  
 
The macroeconomic policies are normally rule-based2 and stable, that is: policies are made 
for the long-run. Examples include the rules for interest rates which are often decided by an 
independent central bank through inflation targeting or other targets, and overall trade policy. 
Lower level policies, on the other hand, are very often up to the discretion of elected 
politicians. Everyday examples are measures to increase educational attainment, design of an 
effective health care system and regional policies to support depressed areas. 
 
The last example constitutes important elements of special economic zone policies. Even 
though I will not do much analysis on regional support per se, the instruments are quite the 
same as the ones found in SEZs. 
 
                                                 
1 With the revolutionary concept of money representing value through a guarantee, while it used to hold value 
through the scarcity and usefulness of its material. 
2 Rules can still be changed by the politicians also in the short-run, but the threshold is much higher when they 
have to “break” specific rules. Rules have been found to outperform a more flexible policy set, see e.g. Kydland 
and Prescott (1977).
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2.1 Why Economic Policies? 
 
While a few laissez-faire minded people would argue there is no need to regulate the economy 
at all, most agree that state intervention is needed, though the exact level is highly disputed.  
 
The goals of economic policies are still redistribution and financing of common goods. 
Common goods are non-rivalrous, non-excludable goods and services, e.g. the defence of a 
city by the building of a city wall. They are normally underprovided in a free market, since 
those financing it can not charge others fully for their positive externalities. Redistribution is 
now mostly from the rich to the poor (while earlier the kings would often tax the serfs for 
their own enrichment). The responsibility of the state now include3: law and order, defence, 
education, healthcare and provision of many other services. For societies to keep up these 
expenditures they need to have income, taxation, as well. This is achieved through direct 
taxes: income tax; wealth taxes; inheritance tax and tariffs/duties – as well as indirect taxes4: 
state-run monopolies; expropriation of property; state ownership of resources, land, business; 
et cetera. In addition there are policies that do not cost much, but can bring large benefits 
when implemented properly. An example is the interest rate, when leading a sensible 
monetary policy this stabilises the economy to the benefit of all, but when monetary policy is 
bad this can wreak havoc, still at the same expenditure.5
 
Most agree that pure common goods need public financing, thus accepting that the state needs 
income (through taxation as mentioned above) as well. Pure common goods are hard to find 
in reality, but all products with positive externalities that cannot be fully charged can be 
thought of as partial common goods, which are expected to be underprovided in a free market. 
Likewise there can be negative externalities, so that the production cost of goods and services 
do not comprise the full cost, e.g. when causing pollution affecting others. As a result 
economic policies should be applied to remove these inefficiencies, which is really a question 
of correcting the prices. From the side of the government activities with positive externalities 
are encouraged through subsidies (Pigouvian subsidies), while Pigouvian taxation is the major 
                                                 
3 Many will dispute some or all of these, others would include many more, but I believe this list is 
uncontroversial. 
4 Many will not think of these as taxation, but they do have the alternative cost of being abolished, for example 
the state handing out shares in companies to citizens. 
5 The economic expenditure, that is. There can be a substantial political “expenditures” (costs), say, of increasing 
interest rates when (myopic) people are heavily indebted. 
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device to hinder activities with detrimental externalities. Private people and companies cannot 
exercise the same coercion, but are known to use the legal system, which is therefore part of 
the economic system, or other persuasion to impede activities of others that are negative for 
them, while seeking cooperation with6 or rewarding those whose activities bring positive 
externalities. 
 
Many feel some redistribution is also precedented – this policy has been popular enough to 
gain momentum in most countries. As for the level it differs a lot, especially between rich and 
poor countries, but also between countries in these sub-categories, with Scandinavian equality 
versus American entrepreneurship as a fitting, though maybe overstated, example. 
 
These two – externalities and redistribution, often in a combination – should make up all 
economic policies. True, in a political economy there can be loads of proposals and 
implementations that are not rational, but even then it will be based on one or both of these. 
An example: IT Fornebu in the outskirts of Oslo may have been hyped out of all proportions, 
but the reasoning was that externalities would emerge to make it an economic success. 
Another example is that when populist politicians promote policies that will harm the country, 
their support is contingent on the fact that supporters believe they will benefit. 
 
An additional note that needs mentioning is that taxation often causes distortions. Lump-sum 
taxes are preferable, but rare in real life. One notable exception is taxes on negative 
externalities, Pigouvian taxes. To cover the rest of its financing needs the state also needs 
income from a distortionary tax-base. When this is the case the benefits need to be weighed 
against the cost, which typically is calculated as a percentage, as the Norwegian 20 % 
measure. (NOU 1998:16) Trade policies can be neutral, but are often found to be highly 
distortionary. An analysis of distortions in developing countries is given in Krueger (1984). 
 
Finally there is the question of transaction costs. One application is how the cost of dealing 
with several parts in a transaction can make excludable externalities in fact non-excludable, 
because of high transaction costs relative to small fees. Also, standard economic theory often 
assumes perfect information, hardly the case in most markets. Many mechanisms exist to 
increase the information level when asymmetric information is the case, it happens through 
                                                 
6 Trade associations are a common measure to internalise the costs for investments with externalities, e.g. 
marketing, into a common organisation. In a way this can be seen as a private “alternative” to economic policy. 
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the market (e.g. programmes on commercial TV channels testing products) and by the 
government (e.g. state run websites comparing prices of comparable goods and services). 
When the market to supply this information fails – say, by being dominated by non-
trustworthy sources – this points in favour of governments supply (if the government is more 
to be trusted, that is). 
 
Transaction costs are also the case when lack of infrastructure makes it difficult to change 
suppliers. This should be analysed and rectified using the same framework as above, e.g. look 
at the level of non-rivalrousness and non-excludability of goods and services to determine 
whether infrastructure should be subsidised. 
 
As so many other policies SEZs are a mix of the two aforementioned reasons, both an 
instrument of achieving economic efficiency and of redistribution. The balance depends on 
the country in question, but generally the creation of positive externalities benefiting the rest 
of the economy is the dominant rationale. As will be elaborated on later the desirability of this 
depends on its positive and negative effects, as well as the alternative cost. To which extent 
special economic zones are recognised as such varies a great deal. They are, however, 
popular, especially so in developing and transitional economies. I will spell out what they are 
mainly through their history and features, and also by discussing some of the major 
advantages and costs of using them.
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To analyse the topic of special economic zones, one first needs to sort out the nomenclature of 
the subject. Kusago and Tzannatos (1998), find that no less than 19 different terms are used to 
describe very similar, often identical, phenomena. Of these I will only mention some, but a 
copy of his usage list and literature review list is found in the appendix, chapter 9.5, for 
reference. 
 
An important note to make is the inconsistency in the lingo. The choice of term and actual 
meaning of it depends on the author; some do not seem to differentiate at all between the 
terms. 
 
Many of the terms used include the word free. Tax free zone, tax free trade zone, free trade 
zone, free zone and export free zone are examples, all indistinguishable from each other in 
terms of meaning. Thomas define them as  
… an isolated, enclosed, and policed area, in or adjacent to a port of entry, without 
resident population, furnished with the necessary facilities for loading and unloading, 
for supplying fuel and ships' stores, for storing goods and for reshipping them by land 
and water; an area within which goods may be landed, stored, mixed, blended, 
repacked, manufactured, and reshipped without payment of duties and without the 
intervention of customs officials. (Thomas, (1956), p7) 
as early as in the 1956 “Free Ports and Foreign Trade Zones”. This definition highlights their 
function as trading and re-shipping posts. Later the revolutionary decline in transportation 
costs and emergence of standards7 made it possible to move goods efficiently towards where 
processing had comparative advantages, thus the approach of 
Figure 3.1 Simple Import-Export Model 
 
                                                 
7 E.g.: the containerisation revolution. 
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gained momentum. See also the discussion of the OLI-framework in chapter 5.1. The 
generally high duties in this era called for an exception to facilitate this specialisation, namely 
duty-free imports of goods that would be exported.8 Thus the “free trade zones” evolved into 
what would better be described as export processing zones. Rondinelli (1987), p91 describes 
how in many Asian countries the terms FTZ and EPZ are used interchangeably. 
 
“Export processing zone” (EPZ) is the most common term in the genre. Warr defines it the 
following way “Export processing zones (EPZs) are economic enclaves within which 
manufacturing for export occurs under virtual free trade conditions.” in the abstract of the 
1988 “Export Processing Zones – The Economics of Enclave Manufacturing”. This is a 
generic definition that also fits most SEZs very well, naming that there should be enclaves 
(i.e. a defined area), manufacturing for exports and free trade conditions. If any criticism is to 
be made it would be that (1) it omits trade in services9, probably because this was not that 
much of an option in 1988, and (2) that it is not whether the markets are free per se, only how 
relatively free the trade conditions are, that counts – they should be significantly freer than in 
the rest of the host country. 
 
World Bank (1992), p24 describe export processing zones (EPZs) as existing of the free trade 
zone element and industrial park element. This serves as a fruitful division – though there can 
be other elements as well, these are always present and important. More about this in chapter 
3.2. 
 
When I choose the term special economic zones10 this is for two reasons: (1) This is the term 
currently used in India11 and India is the country I will apply the analysis on. (2) My policy 
recommendations will be going a bit outside the conventional box of attributes associated 
with EPZs, therefore the semantically broader word special is more fitting. I choose the 
definition of Ge, which is rather broad.  
                                                 
8 The Mexican Maquiladoras are good examples of this business model. They were originally all placed along 
the border with the USA, where components were easily transported from its neighbour, cheaply assembled by 
Mexican labour and re-exported north. 
9 On the other hand, processing is a word not normally used about services, except data processing – therefore 
EPZ should neither way be used referring to services. 
10 This is sometimes written as just “zone”, to add some variation. 
11 Apart from India it is also the term of choice in China. I assume this is why India changed from EPZ to SEZ in 
the first place, seeing how the Chinese example has set the agenda in Indian public opinion with its comparable 
success. 
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…a special economic zone may be characterized, in general terms, as a geographic 
area within the territory of a country where economic activities of certain kinds are 
promoted by a set of policy instruments that are not generally applicable to the rest of 
the country. (Ge (1999b), p1268) 
However, where my text is unclear it should also be interpreted as a zone in a developing 
country, with features as such. 
 
 
3.2 History of Special Economic Zones 
 
If allowing for only the free trade zone element, one can say that the history of the zones date 
back at least to the days of Alexander the Great.12 Then, the emperor protected the merchants 
of Tyre after besieging them, thus drawing trade to the place. Another example is the judicial 
special privileges in trade that certain cities would often enjoy; a nearby example is the 
exclusive trade the city of Bergen had in stockfish and other products of Northern Norway.  
 
A more recent example – incorporating the industrial park and thus much more similar to the 
SEZs I explore in this thesis – is the first full-fledged industrial estate, set up in Manchester in 
1896. In the following 50 years copies spawned all over the western world, especially in the 
US. Then followed the developing and transitional nations, starting with a Puerto Rican 
private venture in 1947. The first public industrial estate was set up in Singapore in 1951. 
India, the Dominican Republic and Taiwan all started building export processing zones in 
1965. Simultaneously Mexico started the maquila program where Maquiladoras could be 
established with duty-free imports for re-export. In the ‘70s and into the ‘80s SEZs flourished, 
in Southeast Asia, Latin America and to some extent in Africa and the Middle East and the 
rest of Asia. The concept is certainly still alive and well, employment has surged from 
220 000 in 1978 via 374 000 in 1986 to 530 000 in 1990. (World Bank, 1992, pp24-27) 
Presumably using different definitions Rondinelli, 1987, p92 estimates the number of EPZ-
jobs in developing countries to 3.5 million. 
 
                                                 
12 This is pointed out in Miyagiwa (1986), p1, referring to the October 1980 number of a magazine or journal 
called Distribution, which I have not been able to get hold of. 
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A sidetrack is the simultaneous emergence of modern states, with increased influence of 
national governments. This rendered possible an increased extent of the policy to support 
depressed areas. For these to be effective they should be targeted responses aiming at the 
problems faced.13 The areas in question might become the recipients of subsidies and be 
favoured in terms of business support by central or local government. Usually they would 
have strict limitations on eligibility14; otherwise a bottomless drain of expenditures would 
often be the consequence. There can for example be a government grant for establishing a 
certain place if bringing a certain number of jobs if this place has a large unemployment rate. 
Other examples are sale of real estate under market value to potentially establishing business 
and to put up public research facilities to lure them. Such policies have been used virtually 
everywhere, especially in the post-World War II period, when the belief in state intervention 
was particularly strong. Lately this has become less in fashion, part because of economic 
liberalisation, for example through the advent of international bodies governing trade, with 
the aim of achieving efficiency by removing unfair trade practices. One example (though 
disputed) is how the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) made Norway abolish its practice of 
differentiated employers’ contribution taxation. Still, several policies aim at regional 
development in lagging areas – the use of € 135 billion annually by the EU is a prime 
example in this respect.15
 
Back to the industrial estates, man developed ever new knowledge about the determining 
factors to make them a success, such as the importance of infrastructure, how comparative 
advantages should be exploited, et cetera. This will be explored later on in the paper. 
 
 
3.3 Features of Special Economic Zones 
 
SEZs are one of many means to attract foreign investment, generate employment, earn foreign 
exchange (Rondinelli, 1987) and sometimes to improve the terms of trade for native firms. In 
SEZs laws, rules and legislation can be altered, depending on which problems are more 
imminent in the particular setting. However, a few features – i.e. incentives for firms – are 
                                                 
13 E.g. if the problem is lack of infrastructure a subsidy for R&D is less than optimal.  
14 Especially in terms of location. 
15 This is channelled through the Structural Fund, Objective 1. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/objective1/index_en.htm for further details. 
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typical: tax breaks; relaxed legislation; improved infrastructure; reduction of red tape; absence 
of labour union activity; subsidised land; bureaucracy less susceptible of corruption and 
greatly reduced customs procedures/rates. 
 
3.3.1 Tax Breaks 
To attract enterprises the host economy will often offer a tax break. This can be given as a cut 
in the corporate tax rate and/or as a tax holiday, where tax is waived or postponed for a 
number of years, normally on the condition that profits are re-invested. 
 
3.3.2 Relaxed Legislation 
Extensive regulations can be an important reason why companies hesitate to invest. One 
example is when there are strict rules against firing labour, then we will expect fewer workers 
to get employed – because employers fear that they cannot get rid of them in a downturn. In 
this case a loosening of the regulations can lead to higher employment, through a better 
investment climate. Another common example is environmental regulations, some countries 
are more than happy to allow some pollution for a bit of investments. As discussed later there 
can be differences in the actual execution of rules, making a seemingly more relaxed 
legislation leading to a stricter regime, though with a higher degree of predictability. 
 
3.3.3 Improved Infrastructure 
In some countries infrastructure is in a sorry state, and can in no way be expected to reach an 
adequate level in the near future. When this is the case there can be good reasons to focus 
investment in a limited area, i.e. the SEZ. This can be seen as a stepwise build-up, where a 
commercially interesting area receives preferential treatment in the allocation of funds, to 
attract investment. Sometimes the opposite can be the case, firms establishing in the SEZs are 
required to build up collective infrastructure, e.g. roads, railroads, ports and airstrips. 
 
3.3.4 Reduction of Red Tape 
Excessive bureaucracy can be a significant detriment for investments, especially from foreign 
units, as their informational barriers are higher. An example of how bad it can get is found in 
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Mohan (1993) pp96-97 and is attached in the appendix, chapter 9.1. Part of this problem is 
known as regulatory capture, a review of the subject is found in Dal Bó (2006). 
 
3.3.5 Reduction of Duties and Customs Procedures 
Where red tape represents bureaucracy that is clearly uncalled for, this point is more about 
creating a fast-track road to ensure effective procedures where the import-export approach is 
used (see figure 3.1). By separating them from red tape I acknowledge that cumbersome 
procedures and high duties can be chosen on purpose, e.g. to protect domestic industries, 
which is hardly the case of red tape. 
 
3.3.6 Absence of Labour Union Activity 
This can be crucial in countries where labour unions are powerful and hostile to business, as 
is sometimes the case, maybe particularly so in some former communist run nations. There is 
further the possibility of closer cooperation with the unions in SEZs, to facilitate a good 
business climate. 
 
3.3.7 Subsidised Land 
When the SEZ is located in a less desirable location this can be a means to attract companies 
that normally wouldn’t consider investing here. See chapter 4.1.7 on regional policy. 
 
3.3.8 Avoidance of Corruption 
Where corruption16 is a big problem among lower-level officials this can be remedied by 
removing contact between business and bureaucracy. Thus, the pestilence of bribery and pay-
offs can be diminished. An example is when police officers are known to take bribes; then it 
can be beneficial to use other agencies as acting law enforcers on the premises. 
 
3.3.9 Clusters 
Clusters will be treated in detail in chapter 4.1.3. 
                                                 
16 According to Transparency International the costs of corruption can not be quantified, due to their nature of 
being hidden to the public. There are, however, no doubt that corruption impedes investments, as it increases 
costs and risk for investors, much the same way as the lack of rule of law does. 
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These are the features we often observe, some objectives in their own right, some as 
initiatives to obtain other advantages, mostly by being incentives for the firms. The next 
section will deal with some of these specific advantages that zones try to achieve and 
disadvantages people fear from them. As for the mentioned nine points I will come back to 
them in chapter 4.3, where the alternative cost is discussed.
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4. The Countries’ Point of View 
 
This section presents arguments pro and contra special economic zones for the host 
economies. There is also a special section on the economic modelling of SEZs, presenting a 




To analyse the advantages of SEZs I will start by presenting an underlying driver – attracting 
foreign direct investments – using SEZs as a medium. This is not an advantage on its own, 
rather a means to achieve other advantages. True, not all business in an SEZ is conducted by 
foreign firms, but most of those that are not fully or partly owned by foreigners will at least 
export, thus seeing some of the same effects through trade networks. 
 
Afterwards I will discuss the major channels of benefits (in no particular order): 
unemployment reduction; cluster effects; technology transfer and training; SEZs as an 
instrument of partial policy reform; SEZs as laboratories and the option of using them for 
regional policy. Some of these are interlinked, e.g. can training be one of the cluster effects 
and the line between laboratories and partial policy reform is sketchy. 
 
4.1.1 Foreign Direct Investments  
(This part draws on Barba-Navaretti et al., 2004) 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are “investments by a multinational company in 
establishing production, distribution or marketing facilities abroad”. (Pass et al., 2005, p209) 
As is explained in Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000), p14 it also includes loans given 
from a parent foreign owner to a local company. Further, Barba-Navaretti et al. (2004), define 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) as “firms that own a significant equity share (typically 50 
percent or more) of another company operating in a foreign country”. MNEs have been 
steadily on the rise since the mid 1980s17, are mostly large companies originating from 
developed countries, are often in knowledge intensive industries, and, finally, do business 
mostly in developed countries, but more and more in developing countries as well (“The 
                                                 
17 See graph in appendix, chapter 9.4. 
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facts: empirical overview” from ibid. chapter 1.2). These MNEs are the same as those 
discussed in the chapter “Technology Transfer and Training”. 
 
Generally FDIs are either greenfield investments, mergers/acquisitions (M&A)18 or a 
combination of the two. On the Special Economic Zone-topic, the more interesting case is 
when new business is established, always the case with the former, sometimes the case with 
mergers and acquisitions.19 M&A require well-functioning markets, stock exchanges as well 
as other markets. This requires sound institutions, such as a well-functioning legal system, 
transparency for foreign investors and political as well as macroeconomic stability – all this is 
further discussed in chapter 5. As for greenfield investments the requirements are mostly the 
same, especially political stability is important, since any risk of future expropriation would 
reduce the net present value of any investment. In principle both financial and real assets can 
be expropriated, but financial ones are more easily traded and can thus be off-handed to 
someone in less risk of intervention, e.g. a domestic investor if they are favoured. 
 
A special vehicle known as joint ventures can often reduce the problems mentioned, as well 
as bring other benefits. This is discussed in chapter 5.1 in the section on ownership-
advantages. 
 
Regarding the desirability of actually getting FDI there are mixed opinions. Many believe that 
foreign companies are inherently bad, often stating such arguments as MNEs crowding out 
domestic firms, MNEs treating workers worse, profits being shipped abroad, et cetera. These 
are all valid arguments, when true20, but there are also strong arguments pro foreign 
investments, as will be discussed in the following chapters. 
 
                                                 
18 Greenfield investment corresponds to real investments, while mergers and acquisitions are financial 
investments, in practice the difference is blurred or even non-existent as the latter can lead to real investments, 
say, by the acquired company to keep producing in a site that would otherwise be de-invested. 
19 M&A is the dominant form of transaction, taking any form from a buyout where the investor holds the firm 
passively to a takeover followed by full integration. 
20 Often a ”bad wolf” syndrome takes place, where MNEs and other large corporations are judged by far harsher 
criteria than smaller businesses. This sometimes unfair treatment does, however, not remove the need for all 
firms to get scrutinised by stakeholders. 
  19 
 
4.1.2 Employment 
Even though wages are low, unemployment rates of developing countries far exceed those of 
the industrialised world21, and policies leading to the establishment of new industries are 
popular. An often stated aim of special economic zones is therefore to reduce unemployment 
by job creation, and in most cases we find the industries involved to be labour-intensive 
(Kusago and Tzannatos, 1998).  In order to increase the job creation effect, zones are often 
established in areas where a big number of workers are idle, often backward areas, see chapter 
4.1.7 on regional policy.22 This, however, must be balanced against other considerations, 
notably necessary amenities such as strong links to the rest of the economy, a pool of skilled 
labour to facilitate possible higher-order economic activities, infrastructure, etc. 
 
Empirically we mostly find that the activities taking place in SEZs are low-skilled, often 
assembly work and other basic manual work. (Kusago and Tzannatos, 1998) Still, many zones 
evolve over time to more advanced activities, as is also the desire of the developing world. An 
example is how unskilled labourers of SEZs in (then poor) Taiwan in the ‘60s stitched clothes 
and assembled cheap toys, while now middle class labourers in a rich country make flat-panel 
screens in the same zones. (Adams, 2007) The following table from Kusago and Tzannatos, 
1998 shows how the composition of the workforce in Malaysian EPZs/SEZs has shifted 
towards more skilled labour. The same has been the trend for the share of labour intensive 
industries. (Ibid, p8) 
 
Table 4.1 Example of Changing Composition of Workforce 
 
(Source: Kusago and Tzannatos (1998), p8) 
                                                 
21 Exact comparisons between countries are next to impossible, as a large set of definitions and ways of 
measurements are used. But, poorer countries often try to boost their numbers, say, by not including 
underemployed people in the statistics and generally have fewer benefits to necessitate the collection of accurate 
data. Richer countries, on the other side, are more likely to include women in the available workforce-number. 
Keeping this in mind a brief look at the unemployment indicators in e.g. The Economist and CIA World 
Factbook clearly shows how most developing countries have high levels of unemployment. 
22 This has also been the case in many developed countries, e.g. investments made through “Distriktenes 
utbyggingsfond” to promote industrial development in rural and semi-rural Norway. 
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To see the real effect SEZs have on employment one has to remove that job creation which is 
only crowding out comparable business.23 This can be achieved if the elasticities of the 
supply and demand are known, but since it is hard to come up with numbers for these a few 
other tricks can be employed in the analysis. First; one can examine wages, thus finding out if 
SEZs are able to oust alternatives. Since wages in most cases are equal to or higher than 
equivalent work outside the zone, we expect some crowding out to take place, as SEZs attract 
talent that would otherwise be employed elsewhere.24 The effect depends largely on the 
composition of the labour force. Second; some analysis can be based on whom the SEZ 
businesses employ. We find that in many countries women dominate in SEZs, while men are 
more commonly employed in the domestic zone, i.e. the rest of the economy. 
 
Table 4.2 Share of Female Employment 
 
(Source: Kusago and Tzannatos (1998), p9) 
 
This can be interpreted as evidence for de-facto job creation and, moreover, that women are 
the main beneficiaries. A credible explanation for this is the lower education level and 
workforce participation of women in most developing countries – since SEZs primarily attract 
low-skilled labour and need idle labour, women are over-represented. We see from the data 
that the female share of the workforce falls over time, coinciding with the increase in 
advanced activities. This latest train of thoughts hinges on the assumption that female can be 
used as a proxy for unskilled labour, which I believe to hold true on average in most 
developed countries. 
 
                                                 
23 In an economy based on the assumptions of basic models of economics there would be full employment and 
any distortion would be harmful, as it would take employment from more productive use. Empirically we find 
that partial crowding out takes place, i.e. some employment is stolen and some is added. 
24 Assuming that the wage reflects the marginal productivity of labour, society is better off with higher wages, 
even if full crowding out is the case. This section, however, only deals with employment. 
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4.1.3 Clusters and Increasing Returns in Infrastructure 
NB! Part of what is often included in the cluster literature is discussed under Technology 
Transfer and Training (below), therefore these two paragraphs should be seen in the same 
context. Second NB! There are many types of clusters, differing e.g. in scale. The typical 
cluster in this context is what Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) refer to as “clusters of 
transnational corporations”. 
 
A specific form of externalities relevant to special economic zones is (dis)economies of 
agglomeration. Spatial concentration will have both positive effects (economies of scale in 
infrastructure, reduced information costs, developed capital markets, etc.) and negative 
(crowding). Generally the benefits can be divided into urbanisation economies and 
localisation economies, where the former represents co-location of economic activity and the 
latter is when a specific industry groups, which is more relevant to SEZs and will be referred 
to as clusters (short for industrial clusters). Positive externalities in a cluster will often bring 
increasing returns until critical mass is attained, from whence it will decrease. 
 
Famous clusters are Silicon Valley in California (ICT), the Ruhr industrial area in Germany, 
City in London (finance), et cetera, et cetera. Some came to existence as a matter of 
coincidences, some from historical reasons, some from targeted policies, while most for 
various, sometimes complex, reasons. There is a vast field of research on the subject, both a 
strain describing the history and distribution of clusters and a theoretical variety that seeks to 
explain the mechanisms giving advantages to firms in the cluster. (See Malmberg and 
Maskell, 2001) 
 
Clusters can be categorised as either high-road or low-road, or most of the time somewhere in 
between these two extremes. (Das, 2005) Clusters in developed countries often lean towards a 
high-road scenario, meaning that “business dynamism is promoted through investment in 
efficiency enhancement and innovation” (ibid., p4), while the low-road case most often found 
in developing countries give few or no cluster benefits, as the firms are unable to concert their 
efforts due to lack of formal regulation and networking.25 Examples of enhancements that can 
be achieved are infrastructure; education/R&D and common market outlets, Brusco (1992) 
call these “real services”. A special feature of clusters is that connections are often informal, 
                                                 
25 Surveys of this are listed in Nadvi and Schmitz (1994) and Schmitz and Nadvi (1999). The latter also lists 
several useful references in many topics within the research field of clusters.  
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based on trust and tradition, thus many will have old histories and creating something from 
scratch can prove difficult. 
 
As for specific advantages I will mention four of the most significant:  
(1) When using the same type of workforce people with the relevant skills will be 
attracted to the location, since (a) there is increased attention towards that particular 
place to work, (b) the individual firm has less negotiation power when there are 
alternative employers nearby and (c) when demand is big enough employers can even 
concert their effort to educate people with the needed skills or the market or 
government can establish educational institutions. 
(2) The increased market size provides for a more competitive environment in terms of 
suppliers of products and services. New subcontractors can emerge that would not 
have been economically feasible if only supplying one firm, consultants working in 
highly specialised fields can make a living, services catering for many can emerge, 
etc. 
(3) A higher volume of production also means higher output. All else being equal this 
would mean more competition between the firms, but what is often the case is that 
customers are attracted to this location because selection is better, often making the 
net effect positive for the firms. 
(4) Firms (or a co-ordinating body, e.g. the government) can split the costs of 
infrastructure and other investments between them. This is profitable for the non-
variable cost, for example the cost of installing an Internet uplink (most of the 
installation cost is fixed, additional cables to different buildings are incremental) that 
can then be shared between the participators. 
 
This last point deserves special treatment. The standard assumption in economics is to have 
decreasing marginal utility on goods, consumption as well as investment. A necessary 
condition for this to hold is full divisibility of goods. The more relevant measure, however, is 
average utility per unit investment (return on investment, ROI). The higher the share of fixed 
costs to variable costs is, the larger the difference between pure marginal utility and ROI. 
Economists often think of all costs as variable in the long-run, but in the short- and medium-
run the fixed costs is definitely relevant, thus it needs to be taken account of. This is what 
firms do when they “chip in” to pay fixed costs, rather than invest on their own at a higher 
cost. 
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As for the former point, decreasing marginal utility, the rationale of clusters is a question of 
two important adjustments in the theory: 
(1) Specialisation is often found to be profitable. This is also a question of pooling the 
fixed cost, say, by reducing engineering education to only some of the workforce and 
accounting to others. Specialisation is really part fixed costs in disguise, part uneven 
allocation of talent. 
(2) Bounded rationality also means that the full divisibility assumption will not hold. 
Nobody holds full information on all markets, in real life man weighs information 
gathering costs against probable increase in profits, and stop gathering when the 
marginal cost exceeds the marginal utility (adjusted for risk). Anything that can 
decrease the gathering costs26 towards themselves will thus give the firms an 
advantage; therefore many choose to locate in a cluster, even when competition is 
fiercer.27 
 
Caniëls and Romijn (2003), p276 lists the effects as economies of scale, scope and transaction 
and “advantages that accrue from firms locating close to each other… consist[ing] of 
technological or knowledge spillovers”. This is just another way of putting it, economies of 
scale is the underlying force for some benefits, economies of scope comprises most of the 
specialisation advantage and economies of transaction is the major force of the decreased 
information gathering costs. The latter part of the quote I will treat separately under the next 
heading, chapter 4.1.4. 
 
An alternative to clusters would be to put all the activity in one large company and then 
rationalise away all loss of efficiency associated with competition. Intriguing as it sounds, this 
may not be such a good idea, as it has been tried in entire economic systems, failing 
spectacularly. I will not elaborate on this, but briefly mention three reasons why competition 
normally fares better than monopoly: (1) Monopolies, when profit maximising, tend to 
increase the deadweight loss when it increases the production surplus on the cost of consumer 
surplus, (2) Assortment, which consumers value, normally rises when there is competition28 
                                                 
26 This is a question of transaction costs, discussed in chapter 2.1. 
27 This is often found in retailing of products that is only bought now and then, e.g. with cars and furniture. 
28 Khrushchev, in a conversation with Nixon, thought it to be wasteful to have more than one brand of washing 
machines. (Lexington, “The Politics of Plenty” The Economist, 26th May 2007) 
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and (3) Competition gives a mechanism to weed out the less efficient producers as they lose 
in the market place, while new, more efficient, entrants can arrive. 
 
Increasing returns in infrastructure is another example of the full divisibility assumption not 
holding. The idea is that it will be better to develop areas one by one, establishing a full set of 
infrastructure in one location, then using the return on investments for the former to finance 
the latter. (A similar set of reasoning is found in Litwack and Qian, 1998) This is assuming 
that it is more profitable to invest one unit in one zone than half a unit in each in two zones.  
 
Obviously there will be lots of examples where scattering of resources is less profitable, say 
when building roads that do not reach their destinations for lack of funds. Still, as a general 
principle, I think this theory is flawed. Perhaps the most important reason is that empirical 
result show positive externalities for neighbouring network expenditures, (Lall, 2006). 
Besides, what is a full set of infrastructure? At one point the marginal revenue is doomed to 
diminish towards zero. This suggests that it is more a question of finding the equilibrium, 
where marginal utility meets marginal costs (including opportunity costs), as is so often the 
case in economics. 
 
For economic modelling of the cluster phenomena and economic geography of regions I refer 
to Venables (1996) and Krugman (1991). 
 
4.1.4 Technology Transfer and Training 
I will define technology in the broadest sense, not only scientific advances but also those 
relating to skills and even, to some extent, institutions. Regardless of the scope of the 
definition used, one will find that developing countries, on average, lag far behind their 
industrialised counterparts. This is more often than not among the reasons they are poor in the 
first place.29 Given the importance of technology, a chief aim of nations since the beginning 
of civilised life has been to get hold of it, through their own advances or by getting it from 
others. (Root and Ahmed, 1979) This holds true for developing countries and aid as well, the 
transfer of technology has long been an instrument to promote growth.  
 
                                                 
29 I will not go into the perpetual debate whether lack of technology causes other problems (e.g. war) or vice 
versa, most likely the causality goes criss-cross. 
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Though it may sound easy to transfer technology, in practice there are struggles. Some of the 
problem relates to innate incompatibility issues, due to the fact that a technology is developed 
in a certain environment, it often translates poorly to different conditions. Often the 
underlying problem is lack of skills, which can be attributed to low levels of education. Other 
compatibility issues are language, culture, business culture and other country- or region- 
specific properties. A wider technology gap, though increasing possible benefits from 
transfers, also hardens the transfer.30
 
The single most important source of new technology in the developed world (OECD, 2001) 
are multinational enterprises (MNEs)31, holding many patents and lots of know-how, 
spreading it through their area of operations, comprising of more and more of the world. The 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation lists four channels for technology transfer through 
MNEs to take place: 
(1) vertical linkages with suppliers or purchasers in the host countries, (2) horizontal 
linkages with competing or complementary companies in the same industry, (3) 
migration of skilled labour and (4) the internationalisation of R&D. (JBIC (2002), 
p58) 
 
This report lifts the vertical linkages argument as the strongest and most consistent, especially 
because MNEs rely on and try to improve local suppliers. I will, however, also emphasise the 
second point, which is all about the economies of scale and scope discussed under the last 
heading, rendering a market for auxiliary goods and services possible, facilitating best 
practice approaches, et cetera. 
 
As for the skills part, evidence on technology transfers from developed to developing 
countries are mixed.32 There haven’t really been that much research on the topic, but the work 
that has been done suggests many firms do not provide much formal training.33 Small firms 
                                                 
30 See Lucas (1993) for an analysis on how the consumption in less advanced economies mitigates the returns on 
technology unless there is free trade with advanced economies. 
31 UNCTAD (1999), p. 199, estimates just 50 of the US’s leading firms accounting for nearly 50 per cent of 
industrial-based R&D expenditures in 1996. 
32 E.g. is Slaughter (2002) slightly positive, while Tan and Batra (1995) are mostly negative. See p16 in the 
former for references on the topic. Haddad and Harrison (1993) do empirical testing on the subject, finding that 
the main technology transfer is in the form of a one-time increase when foreign firms establish, giving some 
credential for subsidies/zones. They do, however, call for more research, particularly case studies. 
33 This and other on-the-job acquisition of relevant skills is named short-term, firm-level activities by Slaughter 
(2002), p8. 
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are laggards in this field, logical, given that “poor information about the benefits of training, 
the high training costs from the inability to exploit scale economies in training, weak 
managerial capabilities, absence of competitive pressures, or market imperfections” (Tan and 
Batra, 1995, p33) are the main obstacles. It is found that companies are more likely to provide 
training when they employ an already high-skilled work force34, when they produce 
technology intensive products, have foreign capital participation and are exporters. A possible 
flaw in these findings is that training for lower-skilled labour often is of a more mundane 
character, often through learning-by-doing. The learning of these simple skills may not be 
recorded, but can be just as relatively important as advanced training for educated people. 
Another point that may go unheeded is the increased demand for skills and education35 – as 
more firms establish in a labour market the returns on education and procurement of skills can 
increase, and thus incentives are made for governments to prioritise education and people to 
get educated. 
 
A proper treatment of institutions far exceeds the scope of this thesis. See chapter 5 for how it 
influences the firms. As for transfers of this “technology”, this can be analyzed much the 
same way as education: (1) there is a supply side where foreign firms teach the country, 
bringing knowledge on how to run things and (2) there is a demand side where the same firms 
demand proper conditions or else take their business elsewhere. Of the two I believe the latter 
to be important, though often not in a direct way. The former is seldom achieved, since it is to 
high extent positive externalities that will not get charged their full value and thus get 
underprovided. 
 
The cluster nature of special economic zones should provide for more technology transfers 
between firms in the zone, as friction reduces with distances. See for example under the last 
heading, chapter 4.1.3, how labour can be mobile between the firms, as can joint ventures be 
easier to establish and word of mouth can distribute the latest “buzz”, et cetera. A large 
problem is technology transfers to the general economy, since SEZs are in fact often very 
much closed. Rondinelli (1987), p97 criticise them for this with his statement that  
“EPZs and FTZs are usually designed so that they turn out to be "enclave" activities that have 
few backward or forward linkages with local economies” 
                                                 
34 Even though MNEs put relatively low-skilled activities in developing countries, they are often more advanced 
activities than the rest of the economy. 
35 Referred to as “long-term, country-level activities” by Slaughter (2002), p8. 
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Some isolation is necessary, inasmuch as they have different rules and regulation than the 
domestic area. But, it is very detrimental for technology transfer. This needs to be tended too, 
by reducing the curbing of contact between the SEZ and its neighbours, say, if firms outside 
the zone cannot do subcontracting for the firms inside there will not be any consenting 
technology transfers, thus greatly reducing it. Some transfers will occur regardless, especially 
through firms operating both inside and outside the zone and labour that is partly mobile. 
 
On the other hand, special incentives for knowledge sharing to firms outside the zone can be 
the case for SEZs, then the net difference from ordinary FDI establishing in clusters can be 
positive in favour of zones. A practical approach to avoid extortionary policies chasing 
investors away can be to brand it as corporate social responsibility (CSR), giving benefits to 
both the host and the firm. (te Velde, 2002, p12) An SEZ can be useful in organising such 
schemes, but is hardly indispensable for this means when compared to other policies. 
 
4.1.5 SEZ as an Instrument of Partial Policy Reform 
One way to treat special economic zones that can circumvent the first-best paradox is to reject 
the better options as infeasible in the near future, given a political system where politicians 
seek re-election and the publics’ (i.e. the electorates’) bounded rationality stops them from 
seeing the full benefits of a general reform.36 Thus policy-makers have incentives for shorter-
run measures, especially as long as these are Pareto improvements.37 This is reinforced by the 
instances where policies are discontinued by shifting governments due to changing priorities, 
favouring quick fixes over sound macroeconomics.  
 
Moreover, in many cases the historical behaviour from governments give fears to the 
investors that expropriation, sometimes in the form of excessive ex post taxation, will take 
place, meaning that measures must be taken to reduce this perceived risk. Litwack and Qian 
(1998) describe how an SEZ, through reformation of some parts of the economy, can function 
as a shield against this risk, while still obtaining the necessary linkages to generate benefits, 
e.g. tax creation. Spinanger (1984), p65 (quoted from Warr (1988), p2) emphasizes how zones 
                                                 
36 Miyagiwa (1992) argues how it might just as well be politicians themselves that oppose reform, e.g. because 
then they don’t have to face protests from vested interests. 
37 Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991) treats the case of tariffs mathematically, giving the necessary conditions 
for partial reform of these to be welfare-improving. Much of this analysis is analogous for other reforms as well. 
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can be used “to correspond more closely with the factor endowment of the host country”, 
analogous to a movement towards free trade. 
 
The important part is that SEZ-policies must be evaluated against the relevant alternative, 
which often will be no action at all, and not the first-best scenario. This introduces counter-
factual arguments, such hypothetical scenarios have wide distributions of possible 
outcomes/risk in the assumptions. One caveat of this is that (possibly rent-seeking) 
proponents can use the “otherwise nothing will happen” argument on zones, but I haven’t 
seen this argument much in the debate so far. 
 
For more general literature on partial policy reforms I refer to Scweinberger (2003), p697. 
 
4.1.6 Laboratories 
SEZs can also be used as a laboratory. I find it a bit puzzling that this function is not a more 
present topic in the academic literature about special economic zones. That is: I can easily 
understand why the production of the common good knowledge is not the prime target of, 
mostly impoverished, nations seeking to develop. But, I would expect economists, operating 
in a world of lacking data and few opportunities for experimenting38, to grab any chance for 
doing so by both hands. Maybe the reason so little empirical work has been done on the 
subject is that most countries tend to stick to one policy at a time, reducing the variation 
needed to conduct proper econometric analysis. 
 
However, economies that have utilised SEZs have often used a best-practice approach, where 
successful policies are distributed to the economy outside the zones, while others are 
scrapped. Scweinberger (2003) claims that this learning by doing was part of the motivation 
for China to introduce their zones, as a result of unknown, possibly large, structural 
adjustment costs (see below). 
 
The difference between SEZs as partial policy reforms and laboratories are twofold: (1) The 
intention is different: laboratories are means of research on policies; partial policy reform is 
                                                 
38 Trying out different sets of policies would be unique in social sciences, but is, alas, not often feasible. As for, 
say, macroeconomic policy no one would seriously putting a whole economy in peril just to expand the variation 
in a dataset for empirical economic research. Adding to this there are often few relevant observations in time, 
due to yearly observations and a short history of modern nations and economies. 
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instead of full reform, either because it is not wanted or because it is not feasible. (2) 
Laboratories can and should use different policies simultaneously in different zones; the 
partial policy reform argument only recommends using the policy that would emulate full 
reform. 
4.1.6.1 China/Shenzhen Case Study 
After the isolationist policies of Mao, China under Deng Xiaoping started a gradual opening 
of the economy and economic reforms from ca 1979. As the Chinese leadership were wary of 
western-style capitalism, they did a trick, employing special economic zones as proving 
grounds – laboratories. Four SEZs were started, where the objects “were to experiment with 
the development of an outward-looking, market-oriented economic system, and to serve the 
country as a “window” and a “base” in these aspects. Through the window, the rest of the 
domestic economy could be connected to the outside world, even without leaving the door 
wide open.” (Ge, 1999b, p1268) Further: “the SEZs functioned as a laboratory where various 
methods aimed at overcoming drawbacks associated with a central planning system could be 
developed. Fresh concepts and means that originated in a market economic environment 
outside China could first be introduced into, absorbed by, and tested out in the SEZs.” (Ibid.) 
 
The largest SEZ at the time was Shenzhen, a backward area just across the bay from Hong 
Kong. This one also proved the greatest success39, averaging an average real growth rate of 
35.5 % from 1980-1995. (Ibid. p1272) Largely as a result of the SEZ results, in 1984 China 
opened 14 major cities to foreign direct investment, including Shanghai. Moreover, successful 
economic reforms were implemented nationwide; see Ge (1999b), p1282 for specific 
examples. 
 
4.1.7 Regional Policy 
As mentioned earlier, SEZs have been used to subsidise certain, normally depressed, areas, in 
developing as well as developed nations. The desirability of this is a matter of preferences40, 
but obviously targets can be met in efficient as well as inefficient ways. Whether SEZs meet 
the criteria to be considered efficient depends on numerous variables, too extensive to analyse 
                                                 
39 A digression: the 7/11 cup in front of me lists 20 cities, among them Shenzhen in company with Singapore, 
Istanbul, Toronto, etc. Not too bad for what used to be a fishing village not long ago. 
40 An example of such a set is to attribute a higher utility for increase from lower levels, i.e. a falling marginal 
utility rate of income. With this preference set it would be better to increase the income level from 10 to 11 than 
from 20 to 21, meaning that there are combinations where a smaller total increase is desirable, due to better 
distribution (equality). 
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in detail here. The aforementioned are all important, but the cluster-argument poses a greater 
challenge, since there will normally be less of an already existing base in depressed areas. 
Also the alternative cost should always be considered. 
 
SEZs are chosen as a means of subsidising since they are very geographically bounded 
instruments, making it hard for business to pick subsidies from these areas, but take their 
business elsewhere. Sometimes the reason for choosing SEZs is also their high level of 
visibility, acting as a tangible example of action by the politicians to present to their 
constituency. 




This is by no means a complete list of possible disadvantages from special economic zones, 
when bad policies are effective the list can extend towards infinity. It is, however, some of the 
more common criticism, rightly or wrongly so, from both economists as well as non-
academics. Criticism from the latter culminated with Nomi Klein’s (2000) book “No Logo”, a 
rare example of a book in this genre becoming a bestseller. 
 
4.2.1 Footlooseness 
A common criticism of special economic zones is that it brings instability to the host 
economy through public bargaining. E.g. Hayter (1997), p170 give an account on how MNCs 
negotiate to make the location better, mentioning briefly that SEZs are popular results (p173). 
The fear is that since the business is lured by special incentives in the first place, it will be 
easily persuaded to move to the next location as this undercuts the first in terms. This will 
repeat itself until all surplus has moved to the companies and none is left with the hosts, a 
“race to the bottom” effect. Another argument is that much of the business is outsourced from 
third parties, e.g. component suppliers for the car manufacturing industry. This is a problem 
since suppliers can be changed. A final concern of many is that investors are normally 
foreign, which is often believed to increase the risk that they don’t feel any local 
responsibility. 
 
This fear, however, does not take enough into account the substantial costs there are of 
moving a business and of shifting suppliers. Companies invest substantial amounts of both 
time and money when establishing, mostly sunk cost if they should decide to move. This also 
holds true for many transactions with companies, especially when far from home. 
Establishing new relations with other suppliers can simply be too costly, due to hold-ups in 
production, transaction costs and – more important than many tend to think – the risk 
associated with selecting a new business partner. The risk element is also highly present in the 
locational choice as well, if a place uses special incentives to draw companies – what is to 
stop them from revoking them later on when companies have settled? For this reason 
companies nearly always prefer stable, predictable business conditions over small 
improvements in terms. 
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As for the last argument, that foreign companies are less “sentimental” about their location. 
Görg and Strobl (2003) and Bernard and Bradford Jensen (2007) find that multinationals are 
more likely to exit a market, when company size and industry attributes are controlled for. 
This is countered by the fact that they are bigger, and bigger companies are less likely to 
move. 
 
A final argument that needs to be presented in this context, but which I will not elaborate on, 
is that closures need not be a bad thing. Creative destruction is an important factor for 
entrepreneurship to thrive and to promote efficiency. Still, it’s easy to understand that most 
would prefer this to not happen to themselves, maybe especially so when resources have been 
mobilised to attract business, as with an SEZ. 
 
There are measures that can be taken to decrease the level of mobility, but those should be 
used with extreme caution, as they will often detriment investments in the first place. For 
example, if an establishing firm is required to set up its own facilities, rather than renting 
them, a larger proportion of the cost is sunk, thus increasing the cost of moving. But, this 
might lead to the business not investing in the first place, going to an otherwise less 
favourable place where turnkey facilities are readily available instead. This is especially likely 
if the bad news principle is dominant, i.e. conditions may change to a worse scenario, making 
a de-investment necessary. 
 
All in all the footlooseness argument is probably overplayed, but for some more than average 
mobile industries it bears some validity. 
 
4.2.2 Foregone Tax Revenues 
What would have happened if…? The fundamental question concerning economic policies is 
what would have happened if they did not take place. Would all the companies that 
established in an SEZ have established anyway in the country anyway? Likely not. But, if 
some had established at a higher tax rate, the tax revenue of the government could still have 
exceeded that with zones. The underlying problem for the government is a variant of price 
discrimination – they would like to price (i.e. tax) the full surplus, thus leaving companies 
with just enough customer surplus (profit) to still establish. But, since the customer surplus is 
hidden from observers and outright tax differences difficult to enforce, companies that were 
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willing to pay “full” taxes will end up paying less. Some tax discrimination is indeed 
happening, especially with subsidies and lower tax rate for mobile industries. Another 
example is auctioneering of licenses.41
 
Another aspect is when tax revenues can be collected. Most SEZs with tax rebates have these 
for a limited number of years, say, with half corporate tax for the first 5 years. This gives an 
inter-temporal consumption effect, meaning that the government will have to borrow money 
if they want to spend the money now that they expect in the future. For many developing 
countries this is only possible with a high interest rate, due to a poor credit history.  
 
Moreover, this can enhance the footlooseness problem discussed earlier, by putting up such 
schemes they can effectively attract the more mobile firms that are only there for the short-run 
tax rebate. On the other hand, for some countries this type of self-imposed fiscal discipline 




Since the attraction of SEZs is to have a more favourable business climate than the rest of the 
economy it could very well be the case that environmental standards were lowered or 
abolished so that the zones would eventually fit the pollution haven description.42 Thus, SEZs 
would have negative externalities that act as a powerful argument against them. This does not 
seem to be the case for a number of reasons: 
 
First, multinational enterprises doing business have a lot more to lose from public scrutiny of 
their wrongdoings. When Coca Cola Company caused a contamination of water resources in 
Kerala, India this caused a major stir amongst its consumers, leading to substantial losses in 
revenues and eventually that the company abandoned the venture. I will not take a stance pro 
or contra, but I will claim that there is no way Coca Cola is the worst offender on such matters 
in India, but it draws an inproportional amount of criticism. This is the flip side of having a 
well-known brand name. Empirically we find that companies of developing countries do 
                                                 
41 Even when the formal reason for this is to retrieve resource rent (say for limited petroleum resources and 
scarce bandwidth), there can be elements of price discrimination – much the same principle as when amusement 
parks and phone companies charge a fixed fee + a variable one. 
42 See Copeland and Taylor, 1994 for theory in this field. 
  34 
 
indeed pollute more than those of the developed world (Dietzenbacher and Mukhopadhyay, 
2007, p428 and Eskeland and Harrison, 2003). 
 
Even when companies in the zone do not fit the “MNE = lots to lose” description like Coca 
Cola there are reasons why zones could make a positive contribution. First, the fact that there 
are often economies of scale in waste and pollution management (World Bank, 2001, p20) 
lowers the cost43 of acting in an environmentally friendly way. Second, in developing 
countries lack of enforcement of the law is often a far worse problem than excessively lax 
regulations. In a zone one can expect the government to keep a closer eye. 
 
Dean et al. (2005) investigates empirically and find that pollution havens hypothesis do not 
attract foreign investment from the OECD area to China44 and also source other articles 
drawing the same conclusions. 
 
4.2.4. Inequalities 
There is a concern with some that special economic zones will act to keep or even reinforce 
inequalities between developed and developing countries. This is supposedly happening by 
the SEZs being sweatshops. The word sweatshop is used to denote unacceptable working 
conditions. Long working hours and small wages are important ingredients, sometimes also 
hazardous working conditions and abuse. 
 
While there is no doubt wages are lower and working conditions worse in special economic 
zones than in the countries where MNEs keep their headquarters (Kusago and Tzannatos 
1998), this is hardly the relevant comparison. Since productivity is lower in the developing 
countries lower wages is the main raison d’etre in the first place.45 To see if zones are really 
beneficial we must compare them to the rest of the economy. This has been done by the 
World Bank with these findings: 
“Wages in the zones tend to be equal to or higher than wages for comparable jobs 
outside the zones and higher than the opportunity cost of most of those employed. 
Working conditions in EPZs tend to be distinctly better than those outside the zones. 
Safety and health conditions in EPZs are generally better than the conditions in plants 
                                                 
43 See chapter on clusters. 
44 Investments from pollution intensive industries in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, however, are attracted. 
45 As for working conditions there would be a trade-off between these and wages. 
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outside EPZs in the same economies, partly because the EPZ plants are cleaner, better 
lighted, better ventilated, and more spacious. In simpler industries, such as garments, 
with inexpensive capital equipment, most EPZ plants work only one shift. However, 
some EPZ plants, particularly in electronics, work three shifts and others two, so that 
many EPZ workers are obliged to keep unconventional hours.” (World Bank, 1992, 
p17) 
 
As for wages there is also a strain of literature finding evidence of higher wages for those 
employed by foreign firms, see for example Aitken et al. (1996) and Harrison and Scorse 
(2003). 
 
In light of what is mentioned above I see no reason SEZs should be generally considered to 
increase inequalities, but rather often decrease the gap between rich and poor countries. 
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4.3 The Alternative Cost of SEZ 
 
For SEZ to be a first-best solution to the problems it seeks to reduce it needs not only to be 
working, but to be working better than any other alternative. In real life it is not easy to know 
what is in fact viable, but drawing a few assumptions an analysis can be made. I have used the 
non-exhaustive features listed in chapter 3 as a basis here. 
 
4.3.1 Tax Breaks 
If the tax level is too high one would expect this to be the case for all firms, not just foreign 
investors. The same goes for tax holidays; if these are good means for attracting foreigners to 
invest it may also increase domestic investments. Different tax rates can be advisable if there 
are positive externalities from foreign investors46, but otherwise there should be equal rules to 
avoid distortions.  
 
4.3.2 Relaxed Legislation 
Restrictive labour laws can be tempting for the politician facing demands for more 
employment, but can easily achieve the opposite of the desired effect, when firms become 
afraid of over-employment in economic downturns. If such laws are a problem they should be 
abolished for all the country, except if there are differences between the normal industries and 
SEZ-industries that can justify two regulatory systems. Environmental legislation should seek 
to neutralise externalities47, 48 – if the legislation is correct it will give the right prices, if not it 
should be corrected both inside and outside the zones. 
 
4.3.3 Improved Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is investment and should be evaluated the same way all investments should, 
choose those with highest internal rate of return (IRR) when there are projects competing for 
limited funds, or conduct all investments with positive net present value (NPV) when funding 
                                                 
46 Say, for example through technology transfer and other advantages discussed in chapter 4.1.4. It would, 
however, be a huge task to analyse all these externalities for all businesses. 
47 This omits the difference between local externalities (e.g. poison in rivers) affecting the nation and thus 
internalised and those externalities affecting other countries (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions). However, if a 
nation is willing to inflict externalities on others countries in an SEZ, there is no obvious reason why it can not 
do so in its normal industries. 
48 See chapter 2. 
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is abundant. It could very well be the case that investments in the SEZs are the most 
profitable49, but this ought to be tested against alternatives. A problem with the opposite case 
found in some zones, where businesses are required to build public infrastructure, is that 
otherwise profitable ventures might be deterred, to the mutual loss of both the potential host 
country and investor. 
 
4.3.4 Reduction of Red Tape 
Red tape, all those excessive bureaucratic procedures, can be a huge problem, but should no 
doubt be rectified in all parts of the economy. However, often there will be many who have a 
strong vested interest in the present system and will struggle any change that leads to loss of 
privileges. When this is the case, reformation in SEZs only can be a first step towards proper 
reform, but if possible this should be initiated universally. 
 
4.3.5 Reduction of Duties and Customs Procedures 
Maybe will it be beneficial to gather the import-export industries (figure 3.1) of a country in 
specific locations using this measure. Even though an open economy normally fares better 
than a closed alternative the infeasibility of a full opening may favour this type of partial 
opening, thus allowing for at least some trade.  
 
4.3.6 Absence of Labour Union Activity 
The features of labour unions show a wide variation over the world, and it is therefore 
meaningless to make a common characterisation of whether it is good or bad. What should be 
sought is to keep the good qualities and avoid what is negative, difficult as it may be. Here 
SEZs can play the role as test sites, where best practice approaches for both the unions, 
governments and firms can be researched – provided that it is easier to come to terms in a 
limited zone. Other than this I don’t see how SEZs play any role that cannot be achieved in 
the entire economy. 
 
                                                 
49 One possible channel is through increasing returns in infrastructure as explained in chapter 4.1.3. 
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4.3.7 Subsidised Land 
This can be a nice incentive for attracting capital, but need not be confined to special 
economic zones. Regardless, the alternative cost (e.g. selling the land at a profit) should be 
considered. 
 
4.3.8 Avoidance of Corruption 
The same logic as under red tape applies – it would be better to remove it altogether, but as 
this can be unrealistic the SEZ approach can be a first step. 
 
4.3.9 Clusters 
Clusters can be established regardless of the presence of an SEZ. I do not see essentials that 
can only be achieved through an SEZ, nor do I see any major impediments, except the 




Devereux & Chen (1995), p 711 argue that “it is hard to think of any distortion for which an 
export zone is the first-best targeted response”. As can be seen above I do think there are 
potential cases, but this applies mostly in theory. The big drawback is the same reasoning that 
led to them being the better option in the first place; the same way that optimal reforms can be 
infeasible so can optimal SEZs. If subsidies50 through an SEZ are based on somewhat hard-
to-measure benefits for society as a whole, then the risk of regulatory capture and downright 
corruption would make it difficult to ensure proper bureaucracy in an economy not able to do 
reforms. 
                                                 
50 Subsidies can also take the form of lower taxes than the rest of the economy. 
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4.4 Economic modelling of SEZs51
 
The available literature all focus on the countries’ point of view and is listed as such in this 
chapter. This is only natural, since no zones will be set up without the approval of the host. 
 
Hamada was the great pioneer in this literature with his 1974 article, ”An economic analysis 
of the duty-free zone”. Here he presents a two-factor, two-commodity Heckscher-Ohlin 
theoretical framework and some results. He finds that an exogenous movement of foreign 
capital into the SEZ has a negative welfare effect on the host. However, as Hamada states 
himself, factors that can contribute both positively (industrialisation, learning effects, 
unemployment) and negatively (social and political problems) are ignored. 
 
In a note Rodriguez (1976) extends a certain part of Hamada’s analysis. He finds that, under 
the assumption of full factor mobility between the SEZ and the rest of the host country, SEZs 
are perfect substitutes for free trade (as long as income can be spent where it is earned), and 
thus can give the same welfare level as free trade. Further, all trade will be done by the SEZ. 
 
Hamilton and Svensson extend the original Hamada analysis in the 1982 “On the welfare 
effects on a ‘duty-free zone’”. They confirm the result that capital inflow diminish welfare, 
however, they differ from Hamada when they find that capital imported to the SEZ is even 
worse for the welfare of the host than if imported to the non-SEZ area. In their 1983 “On the 
choice between capital import and labor export” they make a clear distinction between the 
cases where capital is mobile and where it is sector-specific. They find that import of capital 
to the export sector (protected sector) increases (decreases) welfare, given sector-specific 
capital – while mobile capital decreases welfare. Thus, they find that an SEZ can be a 
substitute for capital import to the export sector of the economy, especially when this capital 
import is infeasible. Further, good tax policies can further increase the advantages of SEZs. 
 
Miyagiwa (1986) extends the framework with an application of a Krueger multi-sector model 
and finds that establishment of an SEZ can lead to welfare increase – contrary to Hamada. 
This hinges on the relative factor intensity of a free-trade zone. The Krueger multi-sector 
                                                 
51 Duty-free zone, export processing zone, export zone and free-trade zone are all terms used in this strain of 
literature. 
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model is based on both the Ricardo-Viner and the Heckscher-Ohlin models and was 
introduced by Krueger in the 1977 paper “Growth, Distortions, and Patterns of Trade among 
Many Countries”. 
 
In his 1986 paper “International factor movements, repatriation and welfare” Wong elaborates 
on the problems addressed by Hamilton and Svensson (1983) and also explains why Hamada 
and Hamilton/Svensson reach different conclusions. 
 
Young (1987) puts a special emphasis on distortions in his extension of the Hamada model. 
He introduces intermediate inputs in the equations and finds that distortions lead to lower 
national income and welfare if  
(1) there is less substitutability between the intermediate and labor than between these 
factors and capital, (2) there is currently a small foreign-owned sector in which the 
share of labor in total costs is large relative to the share of the imported intermediate 
in the foreign sector and relative to the share of labor in total costs in the domestic 
zone. (Young, 1987, p369) 
 
Young and Miyagiwa (1987) are the first to introduce unemployment into the Hamada 
framework. Using a Harris-Todaro (see Harris and Todaro (1970)) type unemployment, they 
find positive effects for the welfare of the host country, given a reduction of tariffs on 
intermediate imports. This is important, as unemployment is one of the main quoted reasons 
for establishing EPZs in the first place. The analysis is later extended by Chaudhuri and 
Adhikari (1993). This note emphasises the risk of welfare loss, as they find that SEZs may 
increase unemployment. 
 
Miyagiwa (1993) deals with the ideal locational choice of SEZs, comparing the lowering of 
unemployment when having an urban SEZ with the broadening of the economic base when 
having a rural SEZ. His finding is that mobile domestic capital warrants rural areas as the 
preferential choice, while the case of sector-specific capital it is inconclusive and can be either 
urban or rural. 
 
In his 1996 “Unemployment Reduction in the Presence of a Rural Based Free Trade Zone: 
Some Policy Implications” Basu gets results differing from Miyagiwa (1993), now an 
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establishment of a rural SEZ means an increase in employment but a reduction in national 
income. 
 
Beladi and Marjit (1992) find that foreign investment through an SEZ is beneficial for 
countries importing labour-intensive goods, while bad for those importing capital-intensive 
goods. 
 
Tsui (1993) uses bargaining between the SEZ firm and the host government as an organising 
framework, finding that the distribution of gains depends on the relative bargaining strength. 
Also he finds that wage in the SEZ should be set equal to the national wage to avoid 
distortions, and discusses how optimal incentive packages depend heavily on the institutional 
constraints. 
 
Din is the first one to model linkages in his 1994 “Export processing zones and backward 
linkages”. Here a third sector is introduced, the intermediate good-producing sector, and 
welfare for the country is analysed both when this sector is trading internationally and not. A 
non-traded intermediate good means SEZ will raise welfare levels as long as the intermediate 
good is labour-intensive52. For capital-intensive intermediate goods this is the case given the 
assumption that the SEZ sector has a higher labour/intermediate good ratio than the non-SEZ 
sector using the same intermediate product53. However, if the intermediate good is traded, 
welfare is not influenced by the foreign investment associated with an SEZ. 
 
The main contribution of Devereux and Chen (1995) is to split the effects of the SEZ into the 
volume of trade effect and the factor terms-of-trade effect. The factor terms-of-trade effect 
had hitherto been ignored54 by most of the literature, but is found to be important as it is 
raising welfare. Another finding is that quantitative protection of the domestic sector 
improves welfare, regardless of the factor intensity of the protected sector. 
 
Ge takes account of technological learning and adaptation in his 1999 “The Dynamics of 
Export-Processing Zones”. The conclusion is that SEZs, implemented properly, can be an 
                                                 
52 This raises the price for the intermediate product, thus raising wages and lowering returns to domestic capital. 
Wages are also affected positively by the increased demand for labour by the SEZ. The net welfare effect is 
positive for the country. 
53 Also here the positive effect of higher wages will exceed the negative effect of lowered returns to domestic 
capital. 
54 Due to the assumption of local factor price equalization. 
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effective means of achieving economic openness and growth. For maximum benefit it is 
important to strengthen linkages between the SEZ and the domestic zone (DZ) through 
policies. Also policies concerning the DZ needs implementing, the discrepancy between 
countries here is presented by the author as a possible reason why some countries succeed 
with their SEZ and some do not. In addition, Ge says that SEZs can lead to economic 
openness and liberalisation since they are trade enhancing (“a partial opening of the capital 
account”). 
 
Tetsu (2004) does a study on the locational choice of SEZs. A significant result is that 
“…attracting foreign firms which are more labor-intensive (capital-intensive) than the rural 
domestic firms into the rural-based EPZ is the best (worst) policy for developing countries.” 
 
Litwack and Qian take a different approach in their 1998 “Balanced or Unbalanced 
Development: Special Economic Zones as Catalysts for Transition”. The underlying problem 
is the perceived risk of investors that the state will confiscate their gains through ex-post 
increased taxation or expropriation if they do well, and thus investments are cancelled. The 
fix is to constrain the state, also through ensuring enough revenues to make ex-post action 
unnecessary. Here SEZs are seen as a vehicle to do a gradual restructuring of the economy55. 
 
All in all many of the features of SEZs are introduced, but analysed individually conclusions 
leap in all directions. While I acknowledge that some of them are difficult to model, I hope 
most of the points in chapter 4.1 and 4.2 will eventually be part of a single model, as time 
goes by there could even be enough data to calibrate a quantitative version.
                                                 
55 It is assumed that a lack of resources makes the investments of a complete overhaul of the economy 
impossible. 
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5. The Firms’ Point of View 
 
Whereas the last section dealt with the point of view from the hosts’ side – the supply side of 
the equation, this is all futile unless there is also a demand side. For there to be a demand to 
locate in special economic zones, conditions need to be attractive enough for firms to 
establish. I will write using foreign multinational, often large, enterprises as the typical firm, 
though most of the analysis should be relevant for domestic and/or smaller firms as well. 
 
Some features that are positive for the host economy are equally negative for the firms, and 
vice versa. There are, however, also mutually beneficial things to be done, making it possible 
for SEZs to have a net-effect. 
 
As an overlying model I will present the OLI-framework, devised by Dunning. Moreover, I 
will look at determinants for foreign direct investments in general, with additional comments 
relevant for special economic zones. 
 
 
5.1 OLI – Ownership, Location, Internalisation 
As told in Tolentino (2001) the foundation of the OLI-framework started with the 1976 Nobel 
symposium (published in Dunning (1977)), then evolving into an eclectic paradigm in the 
mid ‘80s. This theory comprises three factors: ownership advantages, locational advantages 
and internalisation advantages as the legs of a “three-legged stool”. (Dunning, 1998) The idea 
is that these are the factors determining whether a business will be a success, according to 
Dunning all equally important. (Ibid.) 
 
The ownership advantage has to do with the comparative advantages of the owners. E.g. some 
firms have an outstanding culture of innovation, while others are known as safe steady 
performers. Drawing an analogy to international economics they should then specialise, it will 
be hard for the innovator to fix any venture into a stable business, vice versa should the safe 
bet firm be reluctant to change its strategy into an early developer one, when resources to do 
so are not there.56
                                                 
56 Obviously all firms will have several capabilities, but this is not different from the fact that countries don’t do 
full specialisation, say Germany only producing cars. 
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Locational advantages emerge for different reasons, Dunning (1992), pp56-61 lists 4 
important ones. (1) It can be market seeking, say a foreign entrant establishing in a large 
lucrative market to get a share of the business. Another option (2) is that the first and foremost 
reason is to get hold of resources; this could be cheap factor inputs (capital or labour) or 
specific natural resources, energy, etc. found in particular locations. Larger firms will often 
try to seek efficiency (3) by splitting production, say, by adding labour intensive work in an 
area of cheap labour and transport to a place of cheap energy to add this, then ship it off to the 
final market for finalising and sale. An alternative to the firm doing this on its own is to split 
the production between companies, typically with one firm using components bought from 
others. A final locational advantage (4) is strategic asset seeking, e.g. by getting a foothold in 
a market that might become a supplier of brainpower. 
 
Internalisation advantage is basically a question of make-or-buy. Some firms excel at the 
whole production chain and should exploit this. Even if better producers exist it can be better 
to do it yourself if fearing that suppliers will turn against you and start competing, this is also 
a question of establishment costs and levels of trust. Contrary, other firms are number one at 
only a small part of the production and should stick to this, pooling with others to make the 
complete product. 
 
The OLI-framework is extremely wide and the three advantages will blend in a fine mesh, 
often undistinguishable from one another. E.g. internalisation advantages will be closely 
related to both ownership advantages and efficiency seeking. This, however, misses the point, 
which is to analyse the situation in a broad perspective. 
 
5.1.1 Special Economic Zones in an OLI-framework 
Ownership-advantages might be relevant for SEZs in some cases. Mostly those O-specific 
advantages are the same as with any FDI, but there can be special schemes to link companies 
in an SEZ setting. This could have been general means for all of the economy, but SEZs 
provide an advantage through lowering the information costs, since companies know which 
channel to use for linking up with partners. 
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Locational advantages are the alpha and omega of SEZs. Better infrastructure, externalities of 
a cluster, easy access to cost-effective labour, et cetera – these are all common features that 
attract business. Some are costs to the host country, but many should benefit both the host and 
the firm in the long-run, even after taking the alternative cost into account. This is true 
especially for cluster-effects, discussed in chapter 4.1.3. 
 
As for internalisation advantages SEZs should help to expand the options. This is reasoned 
analogously to the ownership-advantages, but now it is more a question of increasing the 
number of suppliers and buyers in the vertical value chain. 
 
The ownership- and internalisation-advantages is particularly relevant when joint venture is 
the form of entry. Joint venture, as the name more than implies, means that there is some form 
of cooperation between two or more firms. Then the cooperating should be able to draw on 
the capabilities of both parties, for example using the reputation of a large MNE when getting 
equity and using the local knowledge of the native firm to navigate the bureaucracy. A good 
example of a success is Sony Ericsson mobile phones, using Ericsson expertise in telecom 
technology and Sony for music and other entertainment. When this joint venture also utilise 
the right location(s) it is a good example of how the OLI-factors are important. 
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5.2 Determinants for FDI 
In “Getting Institutions Right” Rodrik strongly argues that institutional quality57 holds the key 
to understand how some countries prosper and some do not. I quote: 
Rich countries are those where investors feel secure about their property rights, the 
rule of law prevails, private incentives are aligned with social objectives, monetary 
and fiscal policies are grounded in solid macroeconomic institutions, idiosyncratic 
risks are appropriately mediated through social insurance, and citizens have recourse 
to civil liberties and political representation. (Rodrik, 2004, p1) 
 
As we see a special emphasis is put on investors, in a world of imperfect information the 
abovementioned effects will be even stronger on foreign investors, as they do not know how 
to navigate in a foreign economy that does not fit the description. It is found that even though 
there is also a reverse causality of prosperity giving good institutions, ”institutions exert a 
very strong determining effect on aggregate incomes”. (Ibid.) 
 
Balasubramanyam (2001) (an OECD paper) list the following factors as foreign direct 
investments determinants: (1) The GDP/capita size of the domestic market and growth of this 
is important, simply a means of expanding the sales base with the investment. (2) Resource 
endowments (both natural and human), human will be measured as cost per unit of output, 
natural resources are more important the higher the transportation costs and the less available. 
(3) Infrastructure and communication networks, including a favourable work and leisure 
environment. Without proper infrastructure there simply cannot be proper trade with the 
products and services. (4) Macroeconomic stability, as mentioned above. (5) Political 
stability, also implied by Rodrik (above). (6) A stable and transparent policy framework for 
FDI is probably underrated by most people, but is counting a great deal in investments. Firms 
shun risk and are willing to pay to avoid it, for example by investing in a less attractive 
location with lesser perceived risk. (7) A distortion free economic and business climate comes 
at a premium, says the author. I’m assuming this is when the distortions actually harm them 
(say, by increasing the costs of inputs or reducing the size of the market) or when distortions 
increase the perceived risk mentioned in (6). (8) Tax concessions attract FDI, as long as the 
economic environment is stable. This hinges on the firms actually trusting in it and believing 
                                                 
57 A rather narrow meaning of “institutions” is used in this strain of literature. What is meant is to a large extent 
the formalised institutions through written law and state agencies, not the social fabric of informal alternatives, 
such as e.g. tribal communities. 
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the government will not take “revenge” by confiscating the profits ex-post. (9) Membership of 
trade unions will also be beneficial, expanding the market as (1). 
 
In “Foreign Direct Investment: Good Cholesterol?” (which is really more of a debt vs. FDI-
comparison) Hausmann and Fernández-Arias make a similar praise of macroeconomic 
stability and institutions with the quote: “It [FDI] flows in because it is attracted by the long-
term prospects of a country and the confidence that its policies and institutions inspire.” 
(Hausmann and Fernández-Arias, 2000, p3). On the other hand, they do not find evidence of 
market size being a significant variable 
 
The fact that labour-intensive industries establish in low-cost countries to take advantage of 
lower wages and industries with special inputs often establish where these inputs are to be 
found is apparent to everyone. That the attractiveness of a country can be improved by special 
incentives should neither be a secret. But, the fact that industries differentiate between 
countries to a large extent based on governance and other risk-factors remains elusive to 
many. This is also the major true welfare-increasing means of attracting FDI – special 
incentives are to a large extent beggar-thy-neighbour tactics58 and higher wages and better 
terms of trade for other resources is what FDI is supposed to give in the first place, meaning it 
should only be used to lure investors in the short-term. Even if FDI through improvement in 
institutions crowds out some investments in less stable countries the cake does get bigger as 
distortions are weeded out. So, this is one of the common grounds for firms and hosts, where 
there is all to win on cooperation and sensible policies. 
 
5.2.1 Actions to Achieve the Determinants 
OECD (2003) has made the following list of actions as “Guiding Principles for Policies 
toward Attracting Foreign Direct Investment” in “Checklist for Foreign Direct Investment 
Incentive Policies”. 
The most effective action by host country authorities to meet investors’ expectations is: 
• Safeguarding public sector transparency, including an impartial system of courts 
and law enforcement. 
                                                 
58 Some of them are improving efficiency, say, by lowering excessive tax rates, but many are also increasing the 
level of distortions in the economy. 
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• Ensuring that rules and their implementation rest on the principle of non-
discrimination between foreign and domestic enterprises and are in accordance 
with international law. 
• Providing the right of free transfers related to an investment and protecting 
against arbitrary expropriation. 
• Putting in place adequate frameworks for a healthy competitive environment in the 
domestic business sector. 
• Removing obstacles to international trade. 
• Redress those aspects of the tax system that constitute barriers to FDI. 
• Ensuring that public spending is adequate and relevant. 
(OECD, 2003, pp7-8) 
 
As can be seen advices are straightforward, having much more to do with economic 
sensibility than special schemes, consistent with the findings above. This will be further 
treated in chapter 7. 




6.1 Facts about India 
(Draws on the CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov) 
 
This first general part describing India (chapter 6.1 – 6.3) is meant as an introductory chapter 
for those not familiar with the country. It can be skipped altogether by more experienced 
readers. 
 
India is the world’s second most populous country, located in and occupying the greater part 
of the Indian Subcontinent, often referred to as South Asia. Civilisation here dates back at 
least 5000 years, though today’s India was established when gaining independence from the 
British Empire in 1947. The population stands at over 1.1 billion, with an annual growth rate 
of 1.6 %. Total land area is just below 3 million km2, meaning that population density is high. 
Among the 14 official languages Hindi is the most widely spoken, and also understood by 
many more, however, English is the most important language in national, political and 
commercial communication. Hindu is the dominant religion with 80% adherents, though 
many smaller areas are Muslim and some Buddhist, Christian and Sikh. Though a large 
producer of graduates, the educational system in India is not as well as often perceived in the 
western world. The literacy rate is at 61% (76.4% for the 15-24 age bracket), only 90% attend 
primary school and 12% of the relevant age do tertiary education. (UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics, www.uis.unesco.org) These numbers are misleading, though, much of the education 
is of dismal quality, e.g. has teacher absence been measured at 25%, with an additional half of 
those at work not actually teaching. (Kremer et al., 2005) Moreover; as many as 75 % of the 
graduates in tertiary education are deemed not employable by multinational corporations. 
(Muralidharan, unknown year) On the positive side, the command of English make educated 
Indians more versatile than in many other developing countries. 
 
India is a federal state with 28 states and an additional 7 union territories. The capital is New 
Delhi (part of Delhi), while Mumbai (former: Bombay) is the commercial “capital”. Other 
major cities are Kolkata (former: Calcutta), Chennai (former: Madras), Bengaluru (former: 
Bangalore) and Hyderabad. Though only making up 19.9% of GDP, agriculture employs 60% 
of the labour force, industry has a 19.3% share of GDP and 12% of labour force and services 
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make up 60.7% of GDP, while employing 28%. This must be seen in connection with the 
large extent of subsistence agriculture, also meaning that a large part of the population lives in 
rural areas. The main industries are textiles, chemicals, food processing, steel, transportation 
equipment, cement, mining, petroleum, machinery and software. 
 
Infrastructure in India is considered bad compared to economies at the same stage, especially 
China. The train network is extensive, but should have been upgraded. There’s a dire lack of 
highways, though efforts are made to build a network connecting the major cities. Perhaps the 
worst bottleneck is to be found in cities, both in terms of internal transportation and port 
facilities, terminals and such nodes. Airports are scattered in 341 locations, though only the 
major cities offer many flights. Quality has been dismal, but upgrades are being made. 
Telecommunication has been getting much better lately. Though the number of fixed lines is 
low, mobile phones are spreading at breakneck speed. Fast Internet is available in most urban 
areas. Power is a perpetual problem, both because of a production deficit and due to a poor 
grid, leading to occasional blackouts (especially in rural areas). This can be attributed to 
underinvestment over a long period of time in the sector. (Patnaik, 2000) 
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6.2 Public Institutions in India 
(From Kapur and Mehta (2005)) 
 
India is ruled by a parliament that is the legislative body on the federal level. The executive 
power is vested in the Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, while the president has 
a ceremonial role. Further, there is a judicial branch, where most issues are settled on state 
level, while the federal Supreme Court handles interstate affairs and some matters of public 
importance. The most important audit functions lies with the Comptroller and Auditor 
General (CAG). The central bank is called Reserve Bank of India (RBI). It is not very 
independent; the main tasks are monetary policy and regulatory functions controlling 
ownership. The Finance Commission, constitutionally mandated, has great influence over 
issues of taxation and revenue sharing between central government and state. The most 
influential of the many non-statutory institutions is the Pay Commission, advising on wage 
policies. The others are seldom influential. Finally, two recent regulatory additions are the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI). These were established as part of the liberalisation in, respectively, 
1997 and 1988. 
 
Atypically for most former colonies India established as a democracy and has remained so 
since. In spite of this it is by no means considered a safe haven politically59; recent wars with 
neighbouring countries, nuclear ambitions and insurgencies in Kashmir, the north-eastern part 
and occasionally in some other areas are the main risks. The legal system and code of laws are 
based on those of the UK, in many instances a carbon copy. This gives a far better judicial 
framework than most competing least developed countries. However, a major problem is a 
congested court-system, leading to a very long processing time of lawsuits, which is 
detrimental to investors.60 The legal system of India can thus be seen as both an asset and a 
drawback 
 
The prevalence of corruption in India has historically been high61 and has remained so, some 
say due to a lack of interest by the government. Transparency International now ranks them as 
                                                 
59 Dictatorships can be more stable than democracies, but generally democracies outperform non-democratic 
countries in the long run. 
60 See “The long arms of the law”, The Economist 
61 Wadhva (2000), p208 describes corruption as “rampant”, and that it “added to delays and to the harassment of 
citizens and investors alike”. 
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the 70th most corrupt out of 163 countries. (Transparency International, 
www.transparency.org) The licensing regime (often known as the permit-license raj) 
facilitated this, as corruption prone decisions are left to the discretion of bureaucrats and 
politicians. Now there is a worry of the permit-license raj being replaced by an inspector raj, 
when licensing is phased out. (Kumar, 2003, pp40-41) 
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6.3 Economic History of Present-Day India 
(This section draws on Krueger (1975); Mohan (1993); Kundra (2000); Raman and Diwan 
(2002) and Bjorvatn et al. (2006)) 
 
After a century under British rule India gained independency in 1947, as one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and Bagshi (1972) describe how economic 
growth had been virtually non-existing for the past 50 years and the relative degree of 
industrialisation in strong decline. Shortly after independence India started to become very 
economically isolated, relying on import substitution62 schemes with anti-export policies. 
This was a result of deep distrust of trade as a means to promote growth, seeing how the 
exploitative trade system under colonial rule had been detrimental to the Indian economy. 
Further, many believed India with its vast size could be self-sufficient, on raw materials as 
well as technology. Moreover, at this time Soviet was still seen as an example of how a 
command economy could be successful and India pursued several policies of state planning, 
like the communist countries with an emphasis on heavy industries. Many of the industries 
were state run, and the others were often under heavy bureaucracy requiring an industrial 
licence from the government. The beginning rationale for these controls was (1) to curtail the 
large industrial houses from achieving monopolies or otherwise too large volumes and (2) to 
allocate scarce resources – but this soon turned into ever more controls63 with frequent 
changes in rules and regulations. Other distortions effective were import licensing and price 
controls, while there were a few incentives for export. Additional significant factors holding 
back the economic development are the states of emergency during and after three wars with 
China and Pakistan. 
 
In the 1970s we see a faint beginning of liberalisation through reductions of non-tariff and 
quantitative restrictions on imports and enhanced incentives for exports, while in the early 
1980s there are attempts to reduce the licensing and regulations. In the late 1980s several 
export promotion schemes are introduced while finally in the early 1990s the “structural 
adjustment programme” is introduced to bring serious liberalisation. Most observers see this 
as a consequence of the economic hardship following the external payment crisis of India 
                                                 
62 Krueger (1975) does a thorough analysis of the import substitution regime in India until 1975. 
63 See the appendix, chapter 9.1 for an example of some of the red tape and a description of the interests 
involved. 
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in199164 – facilitated by the necessary political conditions, where the political party Congress 
(INC) stayed in power and could take the reforms all the way through. (Acharya, 2006, pp11-
12) The programme aims to reduce regulations and controls drastically, reduce the excessive 
level of bureaucracy and introduce market mechanisms to a much larger extent. Specific 
features are to involve the state governments in export promotion; reduce the tariffs on 
imports of capital goods; reduce the number of industries requiring industrial licences and 
reduction of tariffs. Scholars differ somewhat on the extent of reforms, but generally agree 
measures are substantial65 (see Acharya (2006) and Ahluwalia (2002) for two different 
views).  
 
In 1993/94 capital inflows expanded, leading to a build-up of foreign reserves, as India chose 
to keep the nominal exchange rate at ease. This was done to support exports, which grew by 
an annual 20 % for 3 years, to curb imports at an (allegedly) vulnerable point of liberalisation 
and also because larger foreign reserves were desirable at the time. As could be expected, it 
was paid for by an upswing in inflation. In 1998 the need for funds to modernise 
infrastructure was put at US $215 billion until 2005-6 by an expert group, acknowledging the 
need for foreign direct investments. (Mohan, 1998) 
 
6.3.1 The Current Situation 
Even though there have been substantial improvements, India is still performing badly in 
terms of conditions for doing business, and there are complaints that reforms must be 
speeded. (”India’s Economy”, The Economist) According to a recent World Bank Survey 
India ranks 134th out of 175 countries in “ease of doing business”. (www.doingbusiness.org) 
Licensing is still a problem for entrepreneurs, both in terms of costs and the time it takes to 
set up industry, the time for setting up a warehouse is twice that of an average OECD country 
and the cost (as a percentage of average income) is more than eight times that of OECD. 
(Ibid.) India scores well on the “Protecting Investors” variable as a result of the sophisticated 
legal system, but the poor results in enforcement of contracts indicate the aforementioned 
problems of court system blockage. The third significant low scoring variable (#158) is the 
tax burden, both because of a high tax rate (81.1% of profit vs. OECD: 47.8 %) and a large 
                                                 
64 The 1991-crisis was caused by the unsustainable Indian macroeconomic policies of the 1980s, triggered by the 
external shock with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A synopsis of this is given in the Introduction chapter in 
National Council of Applied Economic Research (2001). 
65 Peak customs tariffs were indeed reduced from 200% in 1991 to 40% in 2000. (Acharya, 2006, p6) 
  55 
 
number of procedure and the time involved. However, this is still far better than the veritable 
mess of the mid-1970s, described in Acharya (2006), “Thirty Years of Tax Reform in India”. 
Recently there have been reforms in corporate, income and wealth taxes simplifying them a 
great deal, and also to some extent reductions. Most changes have moved in a singular, 
predictable, direction, but in the last decennium some of the reforms were reversed and 
replaced by alternative policies. Maybe even more important, tax administration has seen 
great improvements; IT is being utilised, audit systems built up, et cetera.  
 
6.3.2 The Next Step 
Further reforms are still en route, as described above. There seems to be consensus about this 
among the political parties, but in power this does not have to lead to actual action, especially 
when it comes to unpopular measures that will harm special interest groups. Another 
development is that state governments have started with their own visions and reforms. This 
is likely to expand, especially since the gradual trials of some states turn into successes that 
others are eager to copy. One example of this is how other states try to make their cities the 
next Bangalore in ICT, for better or worse. (Wadhva, 2000, p215) 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Some of the improvements that need to be done in the near future is to clean up all the 
exemptions in the tariff system, rates need to be standardised more, the central tax system and 
state tax systems need to be harmonised and, finally, more people should be included in the 
formal economy66, thus expanding the tax base. Moreover, as Wadhva (2000), emphasise, 
there is need for more reforms in the industrial sector, especially labour market reform. This 
is also reflected by India scoring 112th in the aforementioned World Bank survey.
                                                 
66 Kumar, 1999, using a fiscal approach, estimates the black economy of India to 40% of GDP. 
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6.4 History and Situation of EPZs and SEZs in India 
(This section draws on Raman and Diwan (2002) and Mistry et al. (2006)) 
 
In 1965 the Kandla Free Trade Zone (KAFTZ) in Gujarat is established and becomes 
operational in 1966-67. This was done mainly as a means of promoting the backward Kutch 
region. (KPMG, 2002) Santa Cruz Electronics Export Processing Zone (SEEPZ) near 
Mumbai follows in 1974, originally meant to deal with the electronics sector only, in 1986 
extended to gems and jewellery as well. 1980 sees the introduction of a scheme for Export 
Oriented Units (EOU)67, though until 1988 only 110 units (i.e. firms) were started. In 1986 
four more EPZs are added, in Madras (now Chennai), Noida (close to Delhi), Falta (near 
Kolkata) and Cochin (in Kerala). A seventh zone approved in Vishakhapatnam in 1989 
became operational in 1994. This coincides with a gradual liberalisation of regulations for 
EPZs and EOUs, with more availability of sales in the domestic trade area (DTA), allowing 
subcontracting to the DTA, tax holidays for EOUs and simplification of various procedures. 
 
With liberalisation in 1991 and onwards the rules of the game changed significantly for EPZs. 
Partial decentralisation was achieved by establishing an automatic approval route for some 
investments, though mostly relevant for small-scale ventures. Now the approval can be 
awarded locally for EPZ units, by the Development Commissioner in the EPZ and by the 
Secretariat of Industrial Approvals for EOUs. Duties were reduced for sales in the domestic 
trade area, maximum depreciation increased and regulations rationalised. Further, agricultural, 
horticultural and aquacultural industries can now participate in EPZs and EOUs. 
 
In 1994 state governments as well as private enterprise were allowed to participate in zones. 
The exim (export-import) policy of 2000, section 9-A, introduced the conversion of four 
EPZs to special economic zones, with the following key incentives: 
• Fiscal Incentives:  
o 100% income tax exemption for a period of 5 years, 50% exemption for 2 
years  
o Exemption from service tax  
o Supplies to SEZ to be considered as exports  
o Exemption from Central Excise Duty on procurement of capital goods  
                                                 
67 EOU is meant as a means to promote exports for firms outside the zones and must be seen in the context of the 
cumbersome trade policies India used to have and to some extent still has. 
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• Non-fiscal incentives:  
o Exemption from industrial licensing for SSIs  
o 100% FDI through automatic route to manufacturing SEZ routes  
o Technological Infrastructure (dark fiber network, e-mail, voice mail etc.)  
(Mistry et al. (2006), p10) 
 
 
KPMG lists the following as the salient features of the policy: 
• Special Economic Zone (SEZ) would be a specifically delineated duty free enclave 
and shall be deemed to be foreign territory for the purposes of trade operations 
and duties and tariffs. 
• Goods going into the SEZ area from DTA shall be treated as deemed exports and 
goods coming from the SEZ area into DTA shall be treated as if the goods are 
being imported. 
• SEZ units can be set up for manufacture of goods and rendering of services, 
production, processing, assembling, trading, repair, remaking, reconditioning, re-
engineering including making of gold/ silver/platinum jewellery and articles 
thereof or in connection therewith. 
• SEZs may be set up in the public, private or joint sector or by State Governments 
• SEZ should have an area preferably of 1000 hectares 
• SEZ units would have to be positive Net Foreign Exchange Earners and would not 
be subject to any minimum value addition norms or export obligations 
• 100% FDI would be permitted for all investments in SEZs except for activities 
under the negative list 
• The Ministry of Commerce and Industry through issue of a notification can also 
convert the existing Export Processing Zones (EPZs) into SEZ 
(KPMG (2002), chapter 5.1) 
 
In 2003 the other four existing EPZs were also converted and named special economic zones, 
making SEZ the default option. The “SEZ Act of 2005” became effective 10th of February, 
2006, formalising the framework a great deal. 
 
Lately there has been a surge in proposed and approved zones, in spite of widespread protests 
from farmers and landowners fearing expropriation, but also many of the general public. Only 
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in the last two years 111 SEZs have been approved. (“India economic zones get go-ahead” 
news.bbc.co.uk) A new feature is that the industrial conglomerates of India are entering the 
game, building or wanting to build their own zones. So far this is true for Tata and Reliance, 
two of the largest. 
 
An observation is that the regional policy argument, which led to the establishment of the first 
zone, is now completely overshadowed by arguments of general promotion of growth through 
exports.  
 
6.4.1 Cochin Compared to Other Zones 
Upon my visit in one of the zones, Cochin Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), what surprised 
me the most was the very modest size. As can be seen in the table it is the smallest of the 
Indian ones, but even the biggest is only 10 times as big, compared to the vast sizes of 
Chinese zones. 
Table 6.1 Sizes of the Indian Zones, compared to Chinese Zones 
    
(Source: Mistry et al. (2006), pp16-17) 
 
As can be seen on the next graph CSEZ is indeed among the smaller zones in terms of output 
as well. But, The Santa Cruz Electronics Special Economic Zone (SEEPZ SEZ) is hardly any 
bigger and has still accounted for the bulk of total exports. And the runner up seems to be 
Noida, nor the biggest. A credible explanation for this is that the bustling metropolises of 
Mumbai (Santa Cruz) and Delhi (Noida) draw all the investments, leaving the 
(comparatively) remote city of Cochin fallow. This, however, does not fit the data supplied in 
table 6.2. The double investment figure drawn by Noida in the preceding period multiplied 
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into many times as much increase in investment, and Santa Cruz hardly got any more 
investments than Cochin. Some of the explanation must be the composition of exports. As can 
be seen in table 6.3, gems and jewellery are the main articles in Santa Cruz and Noida, 
inflating the export numbers since they are high value items. But, probably also important is 
the uneven development in India – even if infrastructure gets clogged in Mumbai it is in far 
better shape than elsewhere and at least parts of Delhi enjoys wide lanes, a metro and other 
amenities on an almost western scale. 
 
Graph 6.1 Exports of the Indian Zones 
 
 
(Source: Nair and Singh (2006), p19)      (Indian rupees x 10 000 000) 
 




(US million $) 

















KANDLA n.a. 23.8 244 10720 
SANTACRUZ n.a. 63.6 1190 36385 
CHENNAI 6.8 34.6 2162 12374 
NOIDA 7.9 121.6 2600 17502 
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COCHIN 0.2 58.6 1050 4962 
FALTA 1.4 45.4 80 2597 
VIZAG neg. 60.1 neg 3035 
SURAT   1.4   373 
(Source: Nair and Singh (2006), p20) 
 
Table 6.3 Zone-wise Exports of Major Items 
Zone Items Exported 
SEEPZ SEZ Gem & Jewellery (57.3%), electronics hardware (16.7%), 
electronics software (15.4%) and trading (10.6%) 
NOIDA SEZ Gem & Jewellery (51.3%), electronics software (11.7%), 
engineering goods (10.9%), electronic hardware (6.3%), textiles 
and garments (3.9%) and plastics & rubber goods (2.1%) 
KOCHI SEZ Electronics hardware (28.3%), Food & agro products (22.3%), 
Plastic and rubber goods (10.3%), engineering goods (8.3%), gem 
& jewellery (6.2%), textile & garments (5.9%) and electronics 
software (3.4%) 
(Source: Nair and Singh (2006), p22) 
 
Apart from the observation I made of the Cochin SEZ being small, it also seemed to be much 
diversified, as can be seen in table 6.3 above. This does not bid very well for cluster effects, 
though I could neither way have observed these with only a brief visit. 
 
6.4.2 Has Advantages been Achieved? 
This relates to the advantages discussed in chapter 4.1. 
 
As can be seen from table 9.2 in the appendix (chapter 9.8), some investment has come from 
abroad, though a small part relative to domestic. Net effects are difficult to measure, in theory 
both none and all of the domestic investments could be invested abroad without the zones and 
all foreign investment is crowded out investment that would have come to India either way. 
I’m guessing the domestic part going abroad would be closer to none, given how closed 
India’s economy used to be. I do, however, believe some of it would otherwise have been 
consumed. The prospects of India seeing any of the foreign investments in the former 
economic climate without the zones would be small, though. Either way it is small numbers. 
 
Employment was estimated to ca 80 000 by KPMG (2002), with the SEEPZ providing nearly 
half of that sum. Similar numbers are shown in table 9.1 in the appendix. This must be 
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considered a minimal fraction of a country inhabited by more than one billion people and is 
thus not an advantage that has reached its potential. 
 
As for the cluster, technology transfer and training part it is difficult to say to what exact 
extent this is achieved. I do know there is more potential, though, since surrounding 
companies do not often take part in the value chain. Kundra (2000) gives an account on how 
subcontracting is subject to complex permission procedures and difficult formalities. The 
small size and diversified composition of the zones render significant cluster effects hard to 
obtain. 
 
Although next to impossible to analyse what would have been the case without zones, I 
believe SEZs in India have some merit as partial policy reform and laboratories. This I 
support by the fact that policies for zones keep changing, and most changes seem to be for the 
better. Nevertheless, also here there should be more room for benefit. 
 
In regional policy through SEZs, the foremost exponent of this in India is the zone in Kandla. 
Since it opened in 1965 it has increased steadily to a total number of ca 10 000 people 
employed, export-wise it is among the smaller zones. Whether or not it should be considered 
a success depends on the weight one places on redistribution. One sign that India is not 
satisfied is that most zones after has been placed close to cities, though this must be seen in 
connection with the infrastructure discussed in 6.4.1. What also seems to be the case in India 
is that the regional policy argument goes the other way around; many are afraid that the 
introduction of special economic zones will lead to less employment as it needs space that 
would normally otherwise be used for labour-intensive agricultural activities. This is a big 
issue in India now, but is not that relevant to this thesis. 
 
6.4.3 Are the Costs Present? 
This relates to the costs discussed in chapter 4.2. The alternative cost from 4.3 is presented in 
a condensed form. 
 
Talking to one of the officials in the Cochin SEZ I did not get the feeling they feared the 
footlooseness of multinational enterprises. This aligns with my opinion that this argument has 
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been taking too much attention, but could also part be because India is a huge country, thus 
naturally diversified.68
 
Foregone tax revenues due to tax breaks is, next to fear for less agricultural land mentioned 
above, the main concern in India now. India has had a boom of foreign investment lately, but 
telling to which extent this is because of SEZs is hard. Probably some revenue is lost, 
estimating the amount needs further study. 
 
If inequality is a problem with Indian SEZs it is (1) through investment going to already 
developed areas near the major cities and (2) through some people losing their job in farming 
as mentioned under chapter 6.4.2. 
 
Environmental issues in India do not seem to be a worse problem in zones than outside – 
rather the opposite. Nor has relaxed environmental legislation been an incentive in zone 
policy. 
 
Too much is happening right now with Indian SEZ policy to analyse the alternative costs to 
the full extent. The endemic red tape is being partly removed in the general economy, 
alongside the SEZs. The tax burden is probably too high (see chapter 6.3.1) elsewhere or low 
in SEZs since so much of SEZ-policy is based on fiscal incentives (see chapter 6.4). Many 
worry that land is handed out by the government to freely, this could have been sold for 
profit. In general I will say that policy makers in India, which is so often the case with policy 
makers, fail to make alternative cost considerations explicit or even worse; to consider them 
at all. Such analysis would greatly improve decision making around the world, though a trade-
off with increased information gathering must be made. 
                                                 
68 Though, for regions a single business can still play a big role. 




The consensus in India seems to be that the country is now on the right track69 and has just 
about started is ascension to richness – there is even a claim by the current president that India 
can become a developed country by 202070 (Kalam and Rajan, 1998). The current economic 
growth, combined with a huge population will surely make India a very important player, but 
there is still a long way before the population can enjoy anything like the living standards of 
western countries and some of their East Asian and Southeast Asian neighbours. To put it in 
perspective: A CII-McKinsey study project, “Made in India”, projects the manufactured 
export growth to 650% over the next 10 years, given a set of assumptions. Impressive, were it 
not for the fact of the small base, Indian (total) exports are actually lower than those of 
Norway. (CIA World Factbook)  
 
Many Indians, academics and general population, question the solutions “offered” by such 
organisations as the World Bank and IMF. But, they give few alternatives in terms of 
permanently escaping what used to be called the “Hindu rate of growth”, meaning the average 
of 3.5 % economic growth from 1950-1980. I will, however, fully agree on one important 
objection raised – India is not the same as the rest of the world, and the same medicine that 
was used in today’s developed countries might not work. This is still a bad argument against 
following those same examples, but a good argument for doing thorough analysis on what 
will work.  
 
I will start by going through one policy suggestion and one means of achieving it that are not 
much mentioned in the general literature, namely (1) laboratories and (2) diaspora. The first is 
treated in chapter 4.1.6 and mentioned in chapter 6.4.2; the second is seen here as a tool to 
increase investment directly (chapter 4.1.1) and as a specific means to increase technology 
transfer (chapter 4.1.4). Then (3) will I present more special economic zone advice related to 
advantages that can be achieved and (4) presenting the same with focus on avoiding the costs. 
After this (5) some general economic policy recommendations are made. Finally, I give some 
concluding words on the future of India. 
                                                 
69 See for example http://planningcommission.nic.in for the thoughts of the recent government led Tenth Five 
Year Plan and the upcoming Eleventh, and Acharya (2006), p217 for a summary of how some scholars are very 
bullish about further reforms and productivity growth. 
70 This must be seen in connection with his role as president, encouraging the Indian people. 




As explained in chapter 4.1.6.1, China employed their SEZs in the transformation towards a 
market-driven economy, testing what would work and what not. This was part possible 
because China is an authoritarian state, but also due to non-authoritarian policies that can be 
tried out in democratic India as well. The sheer size and federal structure (variation) already 
present in India71 could be harnessed, trying out different policy sets in different economic 
climates. An example of how this could work in practice is to set up neighbouring zones, 
outside a city in a state, with different forms of subsidies; one with emphasis on less red tape, 
one with cheap land, one with a tax-holiday, different levels of infrastructure investments72, et 
cetera. Likewise the same means could be tested in the countryside of the same state, perhaps 
giving different results. This tried out in several states at once should rather quickly give 
results on which zones are popular with firms, which are profitable for India, and so on – 
provided that data is gathered and compared in a meaningful way. A flip side of the approach 
is that it would demand a large number of zones, but this seems to be the case in India either 
way (see chapter 6.4). Another point contra is that it could prove expensive, but if 
concentrating on cost-effective measures that are expected to give a positive net present value, 
the risk should be bearable. 
 
                                                 
71 E.g. the difference between communist-run Kerala with frequent general strikes and rather business friendly 
Gujarat, though lagging far behind Kerala in education.  Because of the large regional differences results will be 
opaque if this is not controlled for. 
72 Finding the level of optimal investment would be a real feather, though an expensive test. 




India has a large diaspora, people of Indian origin living abroad. Most of these are known as 
non-residential Indians (NRIs) and are spread mostly in Western Europe, North America, 
Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East. India has already adopted some policies to 
involve them in the economy, which I believe will be a good thing. However, to speed up 
these processes I refer to the main flaw mentioned in Gangopadhyay (2005). There he 
describes how policies have changed towards the better in recent years, but as he writes 
(p114) “in the public imagination […], the NRIs are considered to be the repository of the 
much-needed private foreign capital.” In my opinion this is off the track. Sure, capital is 
important for India, but an even more fruitful approach would be to take advantage of their 
“technological, scientific, managerial and other skills” as Parekh (1993), p10 lists up. These 
are real assets that could help India more in the long run.  
 
Linking it to special economic zones: in addition to Indians living abroad investing capital 
and bringing knowledge on how to set up zones and what are the key features sought after by 
companies, they can also play a role in easing the transfers of technology (see chapter 4.1.4.) 
– having knowledge on the Indian as well as other contexts should lower the barrier of 
information.73 Since they can hardly be expected to automatically give technology and 
knowledge away without compensation, conditions must be so that this is of mutual benefit, 
the prime example being when local companies are subcontracting and productivity increases 
gain both parts. 
 
                                                 
73 In my experience there really is a difference. Not so much with the educated classes, but these still make up a 
small proportion of the populace. 
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7.3 Special Economic Zone Advice related to Chapter 4.1 
 
As described in chapter 6.4 Indian special economic zones are not ideal. Nor should anyone 
expect to find optimal cases in the field of economics, but effort should be put to improve 
where the slack is. The following are my recommendations to achieve the advantages of 
SEZs, using the classifications of benefits of chapter 4.1, minus 4.1.6 laboratories which had 
some special attention of its own through heading 7.1 above. 
 
7.3.1 Foreign Direct Investments 
As seen in table 9.2 in the appendix and discussed in 6.4.2 not too much of the investments in 
Indian SEZs are from abroad. This is by and large OK if investments are flowing sufficiently 
into other parts of the economy, but this has only started becoming the case lately. Before this 
India was a very much closed economy and this probably still sticks. As for now India should 
probably continue reforms of the economy, while avoiding the problems presented in chapter 
5. Since the recent investment has received great attention worldwide, India should be well 
known with potential investors. This means she does not suffer the same problem many 




Employment in the zones, as shown in chapter 6.4.2 is close to negligible. This will expand 
with the increasing number of zones, but will still be dwarfed by the Chinese SEZs for years 
to come. India has a favourable demographic dividend, a young population combined with 
falling fertility. Thus there will be a large supply of available workforce in the coming years, 
making it paramount to also make sure there will be an increased demand for labour. To 
facilitate this India may have to do some easing of labour laws, as they are considered rigid by 
world standards (see e.g. Acharya (2006), p210, describing employment as an effective fixed 
cost of production). This could be started in the zones, preceding the general economy. There 
are clearly some that will lose with changes in policies; the challenge is to find those policies 
with the right balance in the trade-off between protecting the interests of the employed and 
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unemployed74. Even if very much bias is put on the employed I believe the current system is 
lopsided and should be rectified in favour of unemployed by easing restrictions. 
 
7.3.3 Clusters and Increasing Returns in Infrastructure 
Cluster effects as per now in Indian SEZs are curtailed in an unhealthy way. (Kundra, 2000, 
p130) Even without opening up between the zones and the outside economy, simple 
adjustments such as increases in the size of the zones and more specialisation within each one 
could give substantial benefits. If also allowing for more interaction between SEZs and the 
neighbourhood, i.e. decreasing the strength of the border, even more could be attained. This, 
however, opens some difficulties if India wants to keep the zones and general economy 
separated. Regardless, some measures can be taken; in my opinion cluster effects should even 
be promoted. One way to explore this option is through more decentralised decision making 
for the zones, as recommended in KPMG (2002) and Kundra (2000) – this should lead to 
greater attention of which potential clusters can be developed. Another is through the CII-
McKinsey (2005) suggestion that SEZs in India should be allowed to sell its products to the 
general economy when paying the relevant duties and sales tax. This could strengthen 
linkages through customer feedback and initiative. General advice on cluster promotion can 
be found in Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999), chapters 5 and 6. 
 
7.3.4 Technology Transfer and Training 
To which extent technology transfers are taking place is impossible to measure without data, 
by nature hard to obtain in this field. Given the low level of cluster effects I reckon there is a 
substantial potential here as well, and this is an effect of particular importance. How 
technology transfer should be promoted is highly situational and I don’t have scope to cover 
this in detail. One important note I will give is to pay attention to the low-tech effects (such as 
learning-by-doing), explained in chapter 4.1.4. Too often economies fight to become the most 
hi-tech, ignoring simpler and more cost effective measures. India can not have only 
engineers75, but needs to put effort into improving the skills of the uneducated. SEZs can 
prove useful in this respect, by introducing some training to their workforce. This can be 
particularly successful if the diaspora is utilised in a cluster-setting, as explained above. 
                                                 
74 Generally policies can be on the scale from ultra-liberal laissez-faire with no regulations, to completely state-
run where all decisions need approval. In addition there are other possible characteristics, such as the Nordic 
flexicurity model 
75 Nor can any other country, of course. 
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7.3.5 SEZ as an Instrument of Partial Policy Reform 
SEZs probably filled this purpose more in their early Indian history. Now, as the regime is 
liberalising, this has become less important, but there are still some ways to utilise this 
advantage. From my experience with and what I’ve heard of the Indian bureaucracy this is 
often sub-standard. Even though bureaucracy is not a policy per se, reforms to improve it are, 
and they are important. Since the administration of an SEZ is to a large extent service towards 
investing companies, this is a great way to introduce more customer-friendly bureaucracy. 
Although both better than the Indian average my two experiences with the bureaucracy of 
SEZs were divided into one good experience (getting access on short notice) and one “had me 
waiting a long time, did not give me better contact details, promised to get back to me, never 
did”. If difficult to change the overall Indian bureaucracy (I suppose it is), some partial 
reforms in SEZs can be a good second best. 
 
7.3.6 Regional Policy 
As mentioned in chapter 4.1.7 SEZ can be a means of regional policy – but this can harm the 
prospect of other benefits, necessitating thorough analysis before decisions are made on 
where to locate. Lack of proper infrastructure, complementary services and educated labour 
are all potential pitfalls in rural India, especially the first is a major reason why most new 
Indian SEZs seems to be located near major hubs/cities. 
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7.4 Special Economic Zone Advice related to Chapter 4.2 
 
Similar to chapter 7.3 I will present advice related to the possible costs. This is presented in a 
shorter, condensed, fashion, since I have already found most of these to be rather 
insignificant, both in general (chapter 4.2) and in the Indian context (chapter 6.4.3). Since this 
part deals with policies for SEZs, given the fact that they are already there, I will not make 
specific recommendations for the alternative cost they bear. 
 
The one cost issue that certainly is present – foregone tax revenues – is already a major point 
in the Indian debate and should lead to thorough analysis being made. This is also my 
recommendation – to analyse the extent of the possible problem and then set taxes right based 
on the findings. As for footlooseness I think India should rather concentrate on becoming 
attractive and then remaining so for investments. Some firms will close either way, but rather 
than try to force them to stay, scaring potential investors, one should try and ease the 
transition for workers and other interested parties, e.g. through training for other jobs. 
Inequalities and environmental issues do not seem to be problems in the Indian SEZ contexts, 
as explained in chapter 6.4.3. 
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7.5 General Policies 
 
This is a bit outside the topic of this thesis, but touches upon special economic zones as well, 
so it deserves mentioning, though not an extensive analysis. As Madani (1999), p79 writes “if 
a policy is good for the economy as a whole, it is likely to be good in an EPZ (or at worst not 
cause harm in the EPZ)”. 
 
As for services vs. manufacturing, none should be favoured in general. The Indian 
government should pick neither national champions nor particular industries (say, ITC), but 
rather remove bottlenecks and let the market decide in a well-governed neutral system. A fear 
is that the success of Bangalore will lead to many copycats, of which many are doomed to 
fail. This is, however, hard to avoid to some extent without resorting to a command economy, 
but can be discouraged by giving other options through removing constraints. Chanda (2002) 
lists the major constraint to India’s trade in services as: labour cross-border immobility, 
restrictions on foreign direct investment, government monopolies in some sectors and 
regulatory capture. 
 
Agarwal (2006) proposes that India follow two strands, “occupying the ground vacated by 
East Asian economies” as they lose their competitiveness in labour-intensive manufactures 
due to higher wages and “is upgrading skills and being integrated into the production 
structures of the more advanced products of the developed economies”. I fully concur on this 
and believe it should be achieved more or less automatically when removing distortions. 
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7.6 Concluding Words – the Future of India 
 
All in all I believe India has a far brighter future than past. Unfortunately, this has just as 
much to do with a past in utter poverty for the average Indian, as it has to do with the high 
growth that is now experienced. India since independence has been too good an example of 
the dangers of economic isolation, my hope is that this is heeded when deciding on future 
policies. As of now it looks like much positive is happening, but this could still be the 
aftershocks after the external payment crisis – a danger sign is the increasing amount of 
complacency. 
 
As for special economic zones much remains to be seen in India. So far it has been next to 
insignificant, but there has been a tremendous buzz and development in recent years. If India 
can manage half the benefits experienced by China it should be worth the try. This, however, 
can only be achieved by including the rest of the economy. Beside, China really is a world 
apart, a mere change in lingo from export processing zone to special economic zone (to copy 
the large neighbour in the east) will not matter unless some of the zeal to achieve economic 
growth is also copied. 
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9.1 Excerpt from ”Industrial Policy and Controls”  
 
Until the recent industrial and trade policy reforms, the establishment and operation 
of an industrial enterprise required approvals from the central government at almost 
every step […]. Before making an investment, an entrepreneur had to first obtain 
approval in principle from the Ministry of Industry. The granting of this approval 
resulted in the issuance of a Letter of Intent (LOI). Armed with this LOI, the 
entrepreneur could then tie up other requirements for setting up the project. If he 
needed to import a capital good, he had to obtain a capital goods import licence from 
the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports (CCI&E) in the Ministry of Commerce. The 
approval for the import, however, was given by a committee set up by the Ministry of 
Industry. If there was also need for a foreign technology collaboration agreement, the 
entrepreneur had to obtain a specific approval for this (a Foreign Collaboration – FC 
–   approval) from a committee chaired by the Finance Secretary but serviced by the 
Ministry of Industry. In order to raise funds for the project, if an entrepreneur wanted 
to go to the capital market, he needed separate approval from the Controller of 
Capital Issues in the Ministry of Finance. For imports of raw materials and 
components, separate licences had to be obtained at an annual basis from the CCI&E. 
In each case an ‘essentiality’ and indigenous non- availability clearance had to be 
given by the technical wing of the Ministry of Industry (the Directorate General of 
Technical Development – DGDT). Once everything was tied up and the unit was about 
to go into production, the entrepreneur had to go back to the Ministry of Industry for 
an ‘Industrial Licence’. 
 
In addition to these approvals, since the enactment of the MRTP Act in 1969, the firms 
covered under this needed to obtain separate MRTP clearances from the Department 
of Company Affairs. Further, resulting from the desire to promote small-scale 
industries, 836 items have been reserved for production in small-scale enterprises. 
Since 1956 there has also been a list of industries reserved for exclusive production in 
the public sector. Since 1977, there has also been a ban on the location of industries in 
the largest twenty to thirty cities. In 1988, this ban was extended to include municipal 
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areas of all towns and cities and to specified areas of influence around the largest 
twenty-one cities. 
(Source: ”Industrial Policy and Controls”, by Rakesh Mohan (1993). Pages 96-97 in “The 
Indian Economy – Problems and Prospects”, edited by Bimal Jalan.) 
 
 
9.2 Excerpt from “Political Economy of Post-1991 Economic 
Reforms in India” 
 
The over-regulatory economic regime extended to virtually all sectors of the economy 
(especially the overprotected industrial sector and an overvalued exchange rate), and 
had perpetual shortages and created a non-competitive industrial sector. The 
economic system under the regime thrived on activities involving directly unproductive 
rent seeking/sharing by various lobby groups and political patronage. Through micro-
level state intervention, this regime had a clear anti-export bias and imposed binding 
constraints on the growth of the real sector of the economy, including the agricultural 
sector. 
 
The beneficiaries of the prevailing regulatory system (politicians, bureaucrats and big 
industrialists), were quite comfortable with quick and assured returns. They did not 
want to change to a different (East Asian) type of system with uncertain long-term 
results. 
(Source: “Political Economy of Post-1991 Economic Reforms in India”, by Charan D. 
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9.3 Skill Mix in Foreign Affiliates of MNEs 
 
 
(Source: Slaughter, 2002, p14) 
 
 
9.4 Trends in World GDP, Exports and FDI Inflows 
 
(Source: Barba-Navaretti et al., 2004, chapter 1, p4) 
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9.5 The Evolution of Terminology 
 
 
(Source: Kusago and Tzannatos, 1998, p31) (Original source (which I could not retrieve): 
ILO/UNCTC (1988), Economic and social effects of multinational enterprises in export 
processing zones, Geneva, ILO, p5) 
 
 
9.6 Some Internationally Used Definitions 
 
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) 
an EPZ is a relatively small, geographically separated area within a country, the purpose of 
which is to attract export-oriented industries, by offering them especially favourable 
investment and trade conditions as compared with the remainder of the host country. In 
particular, the EPZs provide for the importation of goods to be used in the production of 
exports on a bonded duty free basis (UNIDO, 1980). 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 
EPZs are industrial estates which form enclaves within the national customs territory and are 
usually situated near an international port and/or airport. The entire production of such 
zones is normally exported. Imports of raw materials, intermediate products, equipment and 
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machinery required for export production are not subject to customs duty (UNCTAD, 1985: 
10). 
ILO (International Labour Office) /UNCTC (United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations) 
an EPZ could be defined here as a clearly delineated industrial estate which constitutes a free 
trade enclave in the customs and trade regime of a country, and where foreign manufacturing 
firms producing mainly for export benefit from a certain number of fiscal and financial 
incentives (ILO/UNCTC, 1988: 4). 
The World Bank 
an export processing zone is an industrial estate, usually a fenced-in area of 10 to 300 
hectares, that specializes in manufacturing for export. It offers firms free trade conditions and 
a liberal regulatory environment (World Bank 1992: 7). 
WEPZA (World Export Processing Zone Association) 
EPZs are all government authorized areas such as free ports, free trade zones, custom free 
zones, industrial free zones or foreign trade or any other type of zone, as the Council may 
from time to time decide to include (Statutes of the WEPZA, ID/W.6/266/6, 28th February 
1978). 
(Source: Kusago and Tzannatos, 1998, p32) 
 
 
9.7 Some Common Abbreviations in the Literature 
 
MNE = Multinational Enterprise 
MNC = Multinational Corporation 
SEZ = Special Economic Zone 
EPZ = Export Processing Zone 
FTZ = Free Trade Zone 
FDI = Foreign Direct Investments 
M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
 
9.8 Statistics on Indian SEZs 
 










between the two years 
(%) 
1966 70 70  
1970 450 450 50.2 
1975 1,450 725 41.9 
1980 6,000 3,000 34.2 
1985 16,200 4,050 22.6 
1990 35,205 5,868 16.9 
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1995 61,431 10,239 11.9 
2000 81,371 11,624 6.2 
2002 88,977 12,711 5.2 
(Source: Nair and Singh (2006), p16) 
 
Table 9.2 Type of Investment by Source in Indian Zones 
ZONE NRI FOREIGN DOMESTIC TOTAL 
KAFTZ 2.6 0.6 82.4 85.6 
SEEPZ 13.8 21.7 222.9 258.4 
MEPZ 6.6 45.3 68.2 120.2 
CEPZ 18 25 217 260 
FEPZ 5 5.7 178.3 189.1 
NEPZ 34.5 54 341 429.5 
TOTL 80.6 152.4 1,109.9 1,342.9 
(Source: Nair and Singh (2006), p14)        (Indian rupees x 10 000 000, as of 31st March 1998) 
 
Table 9.3 Indian Zones’ Share of Total Indian Exports 
Year Exports of EPZs / SEZs India’s Exports Share of EPZs/SEZs in All 
India 
1980-81 44.7 6,617.00 0.68% 
1985-86 322.9 10,865.00 2.96% 
1990-91 986.70 32,553.00 3.03% 
2000-01 8,552.30 203,571.00 4.20% 
2002-03 10,056.70 255,137.00 4.81% 
2003-04 13,813.56 293,367.00 4.70% 
2004-05 18,655.00 361,879.00 5.15% 
(Source: Nair and Singh (2006), p18)   (Indian rupees x 10 000 000) 
 
Table 9.4 Size and Share of Exports from Indian Zones by Sector 
SECTOR 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
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- - 826.73 
(6%) 
Total 8,552.3 9,189.55 10,053.37 13,813.59 
(Source: Nair and Singh (2006), p21)   (Indian rupees x 10 000 000) 
 
